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American death sentences have both declined and become concentrated
in a small group of counties. In his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross in
2014, Justice Stephen Breyer highlighted how from 2004 to 2006, 'Just 29
counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for
approximately halfofall death sentences imposed nationwide. " That decline
has become more dramatic. In 2015, fifty-one defendants were sentenced to
death in thirty-eight counties. In 2016, thirty-one defendants were sentenced
to death in twenty-eight counties. In the mid-1990s, by way of contrast, over
300 people were sentenced to death in as many as two hundred counties per
year. While scholars and journalists have increasingly commented on this
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decline and speculated as to what might be causing it, researchers have not
examined it empirically. This Article reports the results ofstatistical analysis
of data hand-collected on all death sentencing, by county, for the entire
modern era ofcapitalpunishment, from 1990 to 2016. This analysis of death
sentencing data seeks to answer the question why afew counties, but not the
bulk ofthe others, still impose death sentences. We examine state and county-
level changes in murder rates, population, victim race, demography, and
other characteristics that might explain shifting death sentencing patterns.
We find that death sentences are strongly associated with urban, densely
populous counties. Second, we find that death sentences are strongly
associated with counties that have large black populations. Third, we find
homicide rates are related to death sentencing in three ways: within and
between death sentencing counties; within and between death sentencing
counties following a lag to account for the time it can take for a case to
proceed to a sentencing; and that counties with more white victims of
homicide have more death sentencing. Fourth, we find that death sentencing
is associated with inertia or the number of prior death sentences within a
county. These results suggest what remains of the American death penalty is
fragile and reflects a legacy of racial bias and idiosyncratic local
preferences. We conclude by discussing the practical and legal implications
of these trends for the much-diminished death penalty andfor criminal justice
more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
In the span of fifteen years, American death sentences have become rare
and concentrated in a vanishingly small group of counties. In his dissenting
opinion in Glossip v. Gross in 2014, Justice Stephen Breyer suggested that
the death penalty may now be categorically unconstitutional, noting
"dramatic declines" in death sentences even in states like Texas and
Virginia.' Even within such states, Justice Breyer noted that "[g]eography
also plays an important role in determining who is sentenced to death" and
that "[b]etween 2004 and 2009, for example, just twenty-nine counties (fewer
than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for approximately half of all
death sentences imposed nationwide." 2  This Article describes how the
decline has become still more dramatic since 2009, based on comprehensive
data hand-collected on all death sentencing, by county, for the entire modem
era of capital punishment. While scholars and journalists have increasingly
commented on this decline and speculated as to what might be causing it,3
empirical research has not comprehensively examined the question.4 In this
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775-78 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
2 Id. at 2761.
See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); Richard C. Dieter, The Future of the Death Penalty in the United
States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 921, 925 (2015); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 L. & INEQ. 211, 212, 240-41 (2012);
Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's Future: Charting the Crosscurrents ofDeclining Death
Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1929, 1932-55 (2006); Matt Ford, The
Death Penalty Becomes Rare, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2015); Emily Bazelon, Where the
Death Penalty Still Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016).
Some important recent empirical research has examined the increased concentration of
death sentences in a small subset of counties. A work in progress examines three years of
death sentences, each separated by a decade, to empirically evaluate the death penalty decline.
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Article, we report results of detailed statistical analysis of these data to
answer the question why a few counties, but not the vast bulk of the others,
still impose death sentences. Is it murder rates, or population, or
demography, or some other characteristic of these counties that explain their
death sentencing? We examine characteristics statistically associated with
county-level death sentencing, and we conclude by raising important
practical and constitutional questions for litigators and judges.
The American criminal justice system is imposing fewer death
sentences than at any point in the past three decades. Just fifty-one
defendants were sentenced to death in 2015.5 In 2016, just thirty-one
defendants were sentenced to death.6 In the 1990s, several hundred people
were sentenced to death each year.7 The rapid and stunning drop in death
sentences is even more marked at the local level. There are over 3,000
counties in the U.S.8 Very few counties have imposed death sentences, even
David McCord & Talia Harmon, Lethal Rejection: An Empirical Analysis of the Astonishing
Decline in Death Sentences in the United States over the Last Two Decades (manuscript on
file with author). An Article examines in detail the decline in Texas death sentences. David
McCord, What's Messing with Texas Death Sentences?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 601 passim
(2011). Robert Smith has examined whether trial defense representation may account for
altered geography of death sentencing in recent years. Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the
Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 265-75 (2012). Lee Kovarsky has
examined the increasing concentration of death sentencing in smaller numbers of counties.
Lee Kovarsky, Muscle Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE
L. J. 259 (2016). This Article is part of a research project described in a forthcoming book
examining the death penalty decline comprehensively. BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS
ROPE: How KLLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017) [hereinafter
GARRETTr, END OF ITS ROPE]. Another recent piece examines the Virginia death penalty decline
as a case study. Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death
Penalty, 105 GEO. L. J. 661 (2017) [hereinafter Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and
American) Death Penalty].
DEATH ON THE DECLINE, https://public.tableau.com/profile/dustiboy2 1 #!/
vizhome/DeathSentencesDashboard/DealthPenaltyCases (last visited June 3, 2017)
(presenting these data in visual form and reporting fifty-six death sentences in 2015, five of
which were resentencings).
Id. See also Defendants Sentenced to Death in 2016, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2016-sentencing (last visited Aug. 12, 2017).
Portions of this piece are discussed in detail in a forthcoming book examining the decline
of the death penalty in America. Garrett, End of its Rope, supra note 4. This Article provides
the complete description of the underlying empirical research.
National Associations of Counties, County Economies 2015, at 1 (2016), available at
http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/2016%20CET%20repor KEY%20TERM
S_12.21-v2.pdf (stating "[t]here are 3,142 counties and county equivalents in the United
States"). When referring to counties, we include incorporated municipalities or cities,
parishes, districts, and other types of administrative units. Additionally, a handful of custom
jurisdictions were created to ensure longitudinal-consistencies within the analysis. These
changes are noted in the Appendix.
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in states with the death penalty. Through the 1990s, death-sentencing
counties were more widely dispersed, and small rural counties regularly
imposed death sentences. 9 Even within the biggest death penalty states, death
sentences now come from a shrinking group of individual counties, like
Riverside County, California and Duval County, Florida.10 While the local
patterns documented in this paper may be less visible to the public, the forces
driving away the death penalty are working fastest at the county level. Today,
few counties still sentence individuals to death. The smaller counties simply
do not seek the death penalty any longer.
In Part I, we review the literature and describe prominent studies
assessing death sentencing patterns. In the 1980s, scholars began to conduct
systematic research collecting data on the use of the death penalty at the
county level, beginning in individual states with the pioneering work of
David Baldus, and ultimately studying groups of states and patterns across
all death penalty states." The Baldus study found that death-sentencing rates
were highest in rural areas of Georgia but that death-sentencing patterns were
quite uniform across the state. 12 The first study to report national death
sentencing data comprehensively was the landmark "Broken System" study
led by Professors James Liebman, Valerie West, and Jeffrey Fagan, which
examined death sentences from 1973 through the early 1990S. 13 Follow-up
research found a concentration of death sentences in a small minority of
counties. 14 The authors noted: "Even in Texas, nearly 60% of its counties
did not impose a single death sentence in the period."15 That research has
been updated, in part. A study by Professor Robert J. Smith of death
sentences between 2004 and 2009 found: "The geographic distribution of
9 See infra Part IIA.
10 Id
I DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31 (1990). See generally Catherine Grosso et al., Race
Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S
EXPEIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 525 (J. R. Acker, R. M. Bohm & C. S. Lanier eds.,
3d ed. 2014) (providing an overview of subsequent research); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., Death
Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities (GAO/GGO-90-57)
(1990) (summarizing studies of state-level death sentencing through 1989).
12 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 11 at 124-28.
13 JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-
1995 (2000).
14 James Liebman & P. Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority's Burden: The Death Penalty
Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 312 (2012).
15 Id at 264. Further, data analysis of appellate and post-conviction reversals showed that
state courts were more likely to overturn death sentences from urban than rural and small-town
jurisdictions. Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Pattern ofReversals of
Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 247 (2004).
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death sentences reveals a clustering around a narrow band of counties:
roughly 1% of counties in the United States returned death sentences at a rate
of one or more sentences per year from 2004 to 2009."1 Today, as we will
describe, even leading death-sentencing counties have experienced dramatic
declines in death sentences.
The decline in executions is still more pronounced than the decline in
death sentences. Of the over 8,000 death sentences handed down from 1977
through 2015, just over 1,400 persons have been executed.17 A Death Penalty
Information Center report analyzing executions since 1976, including data
collected by Professor Frank Baumgartner, found that 2% of counties in the
U.S. were responsible for a majority of the executions, and 85% of the
counties in the U.S. had not had an execution in over 45 years.18
In the second and third sections of Part I, we explain our research design
and how we analyze hand-collected data on death sentencing in the United
States for the time period from 1991-2016.19 We first explain how that data
on death sentencing was collected. We then explain how we obtained and
how we analyzed homicide data, data on race and racial fragmentation in
counties, population density data, and income data. Finally, we explain the
empirical strategy, including the statistical models employed to analyze
death-sentencing data.
In Part H, we present the results. In this Article, we analyze county-
level death sentencing during the modern era to try to answer why some
counties sentence individuals to death where others do not. First, we describe
a change in the composition of death sentencing counties from the 1990s, at
the height of the modern era of death sentencing in the United States, through
the past decade. Far fewer rural and less-populated counties continue to
impose death sentences. Instead, population density is strongly associated
with death sentencing.20 However, those large counties have also
16 Smith, supra note 4, at 228.
17 Frank R. Baumgartner, The North Carolina Database of U.S. Executions, U.N.C.
Chapel Hill, Department ofPol. Sci., http://www.unc.edu/-
fbaum/Innocence/executions.htm (last visited June 3, 2017); see also Tracy L. Snell, Capital
Punishment, 2013 - Statistical Tables, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, 2 (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpl 3st.pdf.
18 Baumgartner, supra note 17. See also Richard C. Dieter, The 2% Death Penalty: How
a Minority of Counties Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., at 1-2 (2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
TwoPercentReport.pdf.
19 The phrase refers to the title for Frank Zimring's important book examining the decline
in crime in America. FRANKuN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2006).
20 See infra Part I.B.
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21
experienced the sharpest declines in death sentencing.
Second, we find that counties with large black populations engage in
more death sentencing.2 2 Many studies have found that death sentences are
disproportionately imposed in cases in which the victim is white.23 We found
that an increase in black homicide rates is not associated with an increase in
county-level death sentencing, while cases with white homicide victims are.
Those two factors, presence of large black population centers and white
homicide victimization, have been associated with death sentencing in prior
studies and with a troubling use of the death penalty to respond to a perceived,
although not accurate, racialized sense of threat.24
Third, we find that homicide rates are connected with death sentencing
in the basic models, as well as when we lag homicides by several years, to
account for the time from the crime to a trial and a sentence.2 5
This relates to a fourth finding, that the entrenched practices or "muscle
memory" of a county matters a great deal in death sentencing. We found that
across a range of measures, inertia in county death sentencing practices, or
prior death sentences, is strongly associated with death sentencing. Having
imposed a death sentence, a county is far more likely to impose more. This
could be due to preferences and practices in prosecutors' offices, and perhaps
also the attitudes of local judges and the (in)ability of local defense lawyers.
We develop how the growing geographic concentration of death sentences
arises from path dependent practices, chiefly in large, densely populated
counties with large minority populations.
In Part III, we explore implications for the regulation and the
constitutionality of the death penalty. One question is whether the Eighth
Amendment forbids excessive geographical arbitrariness in death sentencing.
These findings also shed light on the forces that are driving the decline in
American death sentencing. Since the move has been from rural to urban and
comparatively wealthy counties, cost of capital litigation may play a factor
in the decline. The role that race plays in the splintered geography of the
death penalty suggests constitutionally troubling explanations for why some
counties persist in practices that others do not. The role of homicide rates
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See infra Part I.A.
24 This is consistent with the results described in Liebman & Clark, supra note 14, at 271
"We thus hypothesize that the relatively greater share of the risk of crime falling on whites in high
death-sentencing communities, together with the misperceived threat from large nearby
populations of poor African-Americans, gives influential members of these communities a partly
accurate, partly inflated, sense of threat from crime emanating from outside."
25 See infra Part II.B-C.
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suggests that the numbers of murders also matter, particularly when the
murder victims are white. Relatedly, the role that inertia plays also suggests
that personal and institutional preferences at the county level may matter far
more than non-arbitrary factors, such as murder rates. We conclude by asking
what salience these findings will have for capital litigants and for Eighth
Amendment arguments in the court.
I. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DEATH SENTENCING
A. PRIOR RESEARCH ON DEATH SENTENCING IN THE UNITED STATES
There is a substantial body of empirical work studying death sentencing,
and in general, it has documented substantial racial and geographic
disparities in death sentencing. The classic studies of death sentencing in
Georgia from 1973 through 1979, led by Professor David C. Baldus, made
landmark findings regarding the role that race discrimination played in
outcomes in homicide cases. 26  That study also analyzed county-level
patterns, and it found that death-sentencing rates were highest in rural areas
of the state.27 Adjusting for case characteristics, however, they found "no
statistically significant geographic effects," suggesting a "fairly uniform
consensus" in the 1970s among Georgia prosecutors concerning which
defendants most deserved a death sentence.2 8
If Georgia was representative of death sentencing patterns in the 1970s,
however, those patterns may have since shifted. Professor Sherod Thaxton
has conducted a series of studies of death sentencing in Georgia from 1993
to 2000, examining all potentially capital cases during that time period.
Thaxton describes "low reliability" in consistency of charging cases as
29
capital within jurisdictions, but far larger variation between jurisdictions.
Moreover, during this time period, about two-thirds of all homicides were
eligible for the death penalty in Georgia. 30 Of those, white-victim cases were
2.4 times more likely to receive a death notice in which prosecutors seek the
death penalty, all else being equal.31 During that time period in Georgia, an
26 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 11, at 268 n.31.
27 Id. at 121. Death-sentencing rates had been lower in rural counties than in urban
counties prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in
1972, but following that ruling, urban death-sentencing remained constant and rural death-
sentencing increased sharply. Id.
28 Id. at 124-26.
29 Sherod Thaxton, Un-Gregg-Ulated: Capital Charging and the Missing Mandate of
Gregg v. Georgia, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 172-76 (2016).
30 Sherod Thaxton, Race, Place, and Capital Charging in Georgia, 67 MERCER L. REV.
529, 533 (2016).
31 Id. at 540. See also Sherod Thaxton, Disciplining Death: Assessing and Ameliorating
[Vol. 107568
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analysis based in part on the same data, examining death sentences in Georgia
from 1995 to 2004, found that death sentences were imposed 2.38 times more
32
often in non-urban areas, adjusting for a range of case characteristics.
The largest and most complete study of county-level death sentencing
that has been conducted, the landmark Broken System study led by
Professors James Liebman, Valerie West, and Jeff Fagan, examined death
sentences from 1973 through the early 1990s. 33 They found no significant
variation in death sentences per murder across counties.34  Second, in
focusing on reversal rates, they found no significant correlation with such
reversal rates.3 5 Non-significant findings in a second phase of that research
were highly suggestive, however-including a finding of higher reversal
36
rates in counties with large minority communities. An update to the Broken
System study, by Professor James Liebman and Peter Clarke, examined the
2004-2009 data collected and separately analyzed by Professor Robert
Smith.37 They observed that "death sentencing is retreating to its bastions,"
finding an increasing concentration of death sentences in a small minority of
counties. 38 Moreover certain "high frequency death sentencing
communities" were not only increasing their share of death sentencing, but
"picking up speed," during that time period.39 In addition, death sentencing
was correlated with county black population as well as white homicide
victimization. 0 A motivation of this study was to assess what might explain
death sentencing patterns during the subsequent time period in which death
sentences began to sharply decline.
A draft Note has described state-level death sentencing patterns during
the time period from 1991 through 2015.41 Ankur Desai examined four
Arbitrariness in Capital Charging, 49 ARiz. ST. L. J. _ (forthcoming 2017).
32 Ray Paternoster, The Death Penalty in Georgia, 1995-2005 (draft on file with author).
33 Gelman, et al., supra note 15, at 252-54.
34 Id. at 253 ("Our analyses of data at the county level revealed little beyond our state-
level regressions.").
35 Id.
36 James S. Liebman, et al., A Broken System Part II: Why There is So Much Error in
Capital Cases, and What Can Be DoneAboutIt, Sec. V, 246-54,257 (Feb. 11, 2002), available
at http://www2.law.columbia.eduIbrokensystem2/index2.html (describing how "[c]ounties in
states where the homicide risk to whites approaches or surpasses that to blacks have higher
capital error rates than counties in states where the homicide risk to whites is much lower than
to blacks").
37 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 265 n.40; Smith, supra note 4, at 265-75.
38 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 331.
39 Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 270-71.
41 See generally Ankur Desai, The Machine Stops: How Professional Capital Defenders
Are Ending Use ofthe Death Penalty in America (draft on file with authors).
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factors in death penalty states and asked whether each was associated with a
decline in death sentences: (1) homicide rates; (2) life without parole
sentencing availability; (3) the ability of a judge and not a jury to impose a
death sentence; and (4) the presence of state level capital defense at trial.42
Desai found that murder rates were a significant factor in the state-level
decline in death sentencing, but its role varied widely from state to state.43
For example, Texas experienced a sharp drop in capital sentencing as the
number of murders fell." However, murders fell even faster in California,
and death sentencing remained high.45 Desai found four conclusions
consistent over a range of statistical models. 4 6 First, the provision of state-
level capital defense is strongly and robustly correlated with reduction in
sentencing.47 Second, murder rates were significantly but unreliably
correlated with reduction in sentencing.48 Third, the enactment of life
without parole statutes had a small, yet statistically-significant association
with reduced death sentencing.49 Finally, state compliance with Ring v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court decision that required jury death sentencing,o
showed erratic coefficients, suggesting any impact was not sound.51 In this
study, without focusing on the effect of those state-level legal interventions,
we sought to explore whether these findings extended to the county level.52
An important article by Professor Theodore Eisenberg examined
county-level death sentencing in five states, Georgia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia, along with data on murders from
the FBI Supplemental Homicide Reports ("SHR"), and U.S. Census Bureau
data on population, income, and urbanization in counties.5 3 That study,
roughly focusing on the years from 1982 through 1999, found a highly
statistically significant, inverse relationship between the number of death row
42 Id.
43Id
44 Id.
45 Id.
4 Id.
47 Id. For additional exploration of these findings, see GARRETr, END OF ITS ROPE, supra
note 4, at 49-105.
48 Desai, supra note 41, at 1-3.
49 Id. at 1.
5o 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
5 Desai, supra note 41, at 1-3.
52 In this Article, we do not explore whether county-level capital trial defense plays a role
in death sentencing, as we were not able to reliably construct a dataset during this entire time
period regarding county, and not just state-level, capital trial defender offices.
Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates And County Demographics: An Empirical
Study, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 347, 350-51 (2004-2005).
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inmates from a county and the number of murders in the county.5 However,
higher murder rates were consistently associated with lower death sentence
rates, a finding that is inconsistent with our findings here. One explanation
may have been that any given county may have a "limited capacity to process
capital cases," Professor Eisenberg suggested.5 6 Moreover, almost half of the
counties in these states imposed no death sentences at all during the time
period. Professor Eisenberg found that higher income counties "tend not to
send offenders to death row," a finding also at odds with what we will observe
here.58 Counties with higher black homicide rates had fewer death
sentences.59 The author suggested that this might occur because either: (1)
prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty in cases with black
victims, which is consistent with our findings; or (2) such counties have a
greater black population and more black persons in the jury pool, who would
be more likely to oppose the death penalty.60 More urbanized counties, in
contrast, had higher death sentencing rates.61 Again, the Eisenberg study
focused on the time period just before the modem death penalty decline
began.62
Many other studies have examined the role that race plays, particularly
the race of the victims, in relation to county prosecutor decisionmaking. A
study by Professors Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro of death sentencing
in eight states from 1976 through 1980 found that most homicides were
urban, but that in some states, like Georgia and Florida, rural homicides were
more likely to result in death sentences (and that in all locations, white-victim
murders were more likely to result in death sentences). Still additional
studies have focused on individual states and county-level patterns within
those states. For example, a study of New Jersey death sentences from 1982
to 1986 found that a range of factors, substantially differing across counties,
affected the chance that a defendant would face a capital trial, but that one
consistently important factor was the race of the victim.
54 Id. at 354-55, 358.
5 Id. at 358.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 359.
5 Id.
60 Id. at 360-65, 368. See also John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and
Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPUUcAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 202-03 (2004).
61 Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 356.
62 Id. at 350.
63 Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns ofDeath: An Analysis ofRacial Disparities
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, 64-66 (1984).
6 Leigh B. Bienen, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: the
2017] 571
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Studies have examined death sentencing in California, which has the
largest death row in the country.65 A study by Professors Glenn L. Pierce and
Michael L. Radelet, looking at the time period from 1990 to 1999, found
higher death sentencing rates in counties with more non-Latino Whites.66
They noted that California led the nation in homicides, and that the rate for
victimization of blacks was high (but not unusual compared to national
statistics.) 6 7 They found-consistent with Eisenberg's study-that death-
sentencing rates were lowest for counties with denser populations.68
Controlling for a range of variables, and focusing on 262 death sentences in
California, they found that: "The whiter the county, the higher its death
sentencing rate will be." 69 They note, however that "[t]o accurately assess
the full range of factors that may or may not affect criminal justice decisions,
all links and actors in the decision-making process must be monitored.', 70 A
2007 study by the ACLU of Northern California examined the counties that
sentenced the most people to death in that state from 2000-2007.71 Ten
counties accounted for 83% of the death sentences in the state during that
time period.72 The study found real variability in murder rates among the
counties that sentence the most people to death.73 The study observed
correlation between death sentencing and demographics, homicide solve
Role ofProsecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 27, 66 (1988).
65 Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year; ACLU of Northern California,
California's Death Penalty is Dead: Anatomy ofa Failure (July 2011), at
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminaljustice/deathpenalty/thedeathjenalty
isdead 2011 .pdf; Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and
Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REv. 719, 745-
46 (2007); Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem
for Furman, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1283, 1333 (1997). For a description of a study led by David
Baldus and introduced in litigation in California, see Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibility
in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 1069, 1071 n.2 (2013)
(studying Colorado homicides from 1999 to 2010 and finding 90% death-eligible).
6 Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Empirical Analysis: The Impact of Legally
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing For California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1 (2000).
67 Id. at 5-6.
68 Id. at 29-30.
69 Id. at 36.
70 Id. at 37.
71 Romy Ganschow, Death by Geography: A County by County Analysis of the Road to
Execution in California, ACLUofNorthern California, at https://www.aclunc.org/sites/
default/files/deathbygeography_0.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
72 Id at 3.
73 Id
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rates, or voting patterns.74 That study also noted the increasing concentration
of death sentencing since 2000-from 1977 to 1999, ten counties accounted
for over 70% of death sentencing, but from 2000 to 2007, they accounted for
83% of death sentencing.75 A Note examined two California counties with
similar homicide clearance rates, but very different prosecution budgets, and
found a correlation between death sentencing and prosecution budgets.76
A series of studies have examined the role of prosecutorial discretion in
seeking the death penalty. They have found that prosecutors' practices
matter. They vary as between urban and rural counties, but they also vary
based on more idiosyncratic local preferences. For example, a study of
homicides in South Carolina from 1993 to 1997 by Professors Michael J.
Songer and Isaac Unah examined geography and found that prosecutors were
more likely to seek the death penalty in rural counties. 7 The study failed to
find any correlation between homicides and the probability of a death penalty
prosecution-including when the authors controlled for whether murders in
counties were aggravated murders accompanied by other felonies like rape,
robbery, or arson. 78 The authors concluded: "The results of this regression
analysis highlight the arbitrariness inherent in South Carolina's capital
punishment system by suggesting the importance of the individual
proclivities of the local prosecutors who decide whether to seek the death
penalty." 79 A study of death sentencing in Nebraska from 1973 to 1999, by
Professors David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, Catherine Grosso, and
Aaron M. Christ, found decreasing death sentencing rates in urban areas,
consistent with other state studies discussed.80 A Maryland study similarly
74 The ACLU study summarized:
"Counties that are aggressive in death sentencing are in both the northern and southern parts of
the state, inland and coastal regions. They represent counties that have liberal and conservative
views on criminal justice. The counties are both densely and sparsely populated. They have both
high and low homicide rates, and high and low rates of solving homicides. Counties that sentence
people to execution less frequently exhibit all of these same characteristics."
Id.
75 Id
76 Ashley Rupp, Note, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County
Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding?,
71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2735, 2766-67 (2003).
Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on
Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161,
205 (2006).
Id. at 198.
7 Id. at 203.
80 David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81
NEB. L. REv. 486, 668 (2002).
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found geographic disparities, including those based on prosecutorial
discretion; for example, the chances of being sentenced to death in Baltimore
County were thirteen times higher than in Baltimore City, when Maryland
had the death penalty.81 A Virginia study similarly found major geographic
differences in charging practices by prosecutors.82 A comprehensive study of
the Connecticut death penalty, before the state abolished it, by Professor John
J. Donohue, found both substantial race of victim disparities in death
sentencing and geographic disparities.83  A New Jersey study similarly
focused on the role of prosecutorial discretion in death sentencing.
Studies have also focused on single counties, such as two studies of
death charging and sentencing in San Francisco County. Another study of
Alameda County, California found racial disparities within the county in
death sentencing.86 A Texas study examined four large urban counties from
1980 to 1996 and found disparities due to case seriousness, but also due to
the race of the victim. 87 A Missouri study found major differences in first-
degree murder sentencing based on the racial make-up of jury pools." An
Ohio study found large county disparities, as well. 89 An Alabama study found
81 RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH
SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 30-
31 (2003).
82 Tony G. Poveda, Geographic Location, Death Sentences and Executions in Post-
Furman Virginia, 8 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 423, 424 (2006).
83 John J. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System
Since 1973, Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 637 (2014) (finding, for example, that "[c]onsidering the most
common type of death-eligible murder - a multiple victim homicide - a white on white murder
of average egregiousness outside [the city of] Waterbury has a 0.57 percent chance of being
sentenced to death, while a minority committing the identical crime on white victims in
Waterbury would face a 91.2 percent likelihood").
8 Bienen et al., supra note 64, at 178-84.
8s Richard A. Berk et al., Chance and the Death Penalty, 27 L. & Soc'Y REv. 89, 100-08
(1993); Robert E. Weiss et al., Assessing the Capriciousness of Death Penalty Charging, 30
L. & Soc'Y REv. 607, 607-08 (1996).
86 Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics:
Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOzo L. REv. 1227, 1227-28
(2013).
Deon Brock et al., Arbitrariness in the Imposition of Death Sentences in Texas: An
Analysis of Four Counties by Offense Seriousness, Race of Victim, and Race of Offender, 28
AM. J. OF CRIM L. 43, 68-69 (2000).
Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 305, 306-07, 329-330 (2009).
Alice Lynd, Unfair And Can't Be Fixed: The Machinery ofDeath In Ohio, 44 U. TOL.
L. REv. 1, 36 (2012) (reporting results of ABA study finding "(1) those who kill Whites are
3.8 times more likely to receive a death sentence than those who kill Blacks and (2) the chances
of a death sentence in Hamilton County are 2.7 times higher than in the rest of the state, 3.7
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a correlation between homicides and death sentences, and it did not find an
effect of racial composition of a county, but rather racial segregation. 90
These studies, taken together, suggest that at least by the 1980s and
1990s, there emerged great disparities between county-level charging
patterns in death penalty states. The studies also focus on the role played by
prosecutorial discretion. 91 The studies tended to find that urban areas have
lower death-sentencing rates, given their larger populations.9 2 The results
regarding homicide rates are uneven across these studies; the studies did not
consistently find a relationship between homicide rates and death sentences. 93
Somewhat more consistently, these studies have often found that race can
play a role, including due to the race of the victim, but perhaps also with
different effects due to race segregation in a county or perhaps the presence
of more minority jurors in a county. 94 We sought to examine many of those
patterns during the more recent time period from 1990 to 2015.
B. DATA SOURCES
1. Death Sentencing Data
The primary dependent variable in the analysis is the number of death
sentences in a given year in a given county. There was no single authoritative
national list of cases in which persons have been sentenced to death in the
U.S.-such a list was the necessary starting place for this statistical analysis.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") maintains data on the numbers of
individuals sentenced to death each year in the U.S., as reflected in Figure
1.95 However, BJS does not share data with identifiers, permitting one to
identify those persons, what counties they were sentenced in, or other case-
specific information.9 6 Professor Robert Smith, who has led research
times higher than in Cuyahoga County, and 6.2 times higher than in Franklin County").
9 Jennifer Adger & Christopher Weiss, Why Place Matters: Exploring County-Level
Variations In Death Sentencing In Alabama, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 659, 660 (2011).
91 See, e.g., Songer & Unah, supra note 77.
92 Gross & Mauro, supra note 63, at 64-66. But see Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 356.
93 Compare Gross & Mauro, supra note 63, with Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 354-55.
See Donohue, supra note 83; see generally Grosso et al., supra note 11; see also
Stephanie Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-
1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 549, 581 (2006) ("The data show that prosecutorial decisions to
seek death sentences in Colorado .. . are strongly correlated with race, ethnicity, and gender
of the homicide victim.").
See infra Figure 1.
96 In addition, the BJS data is altered from year to year, as BJS learns of additional
information and revises its data. "Prisoners Sentenced to Death and the Outcome of the
Sentence, by Year of Sentencing, 1973-2012," No. 16, 19, in Capital Punishment, 2012
Statistical Tables, U.S. Department of Justice (2014) (revising earlier data to state that 315
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studying the modem geography of the death penalty, assembled a dataset,
which he generously shared with us, for death sentences from 2004 through
2015. Professor Smith's analysis of that data, from 2004 to 2009, uncovered
how fewer than 10% of the counties in the country sentenced anyone to death
during that time period, and about 1% of counties (twenty-nine counties)
accounted for about 44% of all death sentences.97 Professor Smith noted: "In
2009, Los Angeles County, California sentenced the same number of people
to death as the State of Texas. Maricopa County, Arizona sentenced more
people to death than the State of Alabama." 98
We wanted to examine whether that concentration of death sentencing
at the county level has continued in more recent years, and looking farther
back, we wanted to explore when this pattern began and what factors may be
statistically associated with these county-level patterns. Our initial project
was to collect nationwide death sentencing data from 1991 to 2016. We
include resentences, or death sentences imposed after an earlier death
sentence for a person was overturned on appeal or post-conviction, because
those instances represent a new sentencing trial and a new occasion at which
the factfinder chose to impose a death sentence. For that reason, the numbers
of death sentences reported in each year are somewhat higher than those
reported by the BJS and the Death Penalty Information Center ("DPIC"),
which limit their reporting to new death sentences.99
We initially drew upon lists of names of persons sentenced to death
contained in the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's quarterly Death Row USA
reports.1 t' Those names are themselves obtained from state corrections
records. We independently compared current department of corrections
records with those reports. 0 1 We ran news and Westlaw searches in each
persons were sentenced to death in 1994, as compared with 311 in the earlier report). See
discussion in McCord & Harmon, supra note 4.
97 Smith, supra note 4, at 233.
98 Id
99 See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 By State and By Year, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states- 1977-
present (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (describing BJS data and data supplemented by DPIC from
2013 to 2016).
10 Death Row USA, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., http://www.naacpldf.org/
death-row-usa.
101 For example, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice lists detailed information
concerning both current and former death row residents. See Executed Offenders, TEX.
DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST. (July 28,2017), https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/deathrow/
dr executed offenders.html; Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST. (July 21,
2017), https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/deathrow/droffenderson_dr.html; Offenders No
Longer on Death Row, TEX. DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST. (June 21, 2017), https://www.tdcj.
state.tx.us/deathrow/droffenders no-longer_on dr.html.
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state to cross-check those lists of names. In addition, we obtained lists of
death sentences from capital defense and appeals organizations in almost
every death penalty state, and cross-checked each of those lists. 10 2 Finally,
we contacted scholars that have conducted studies of death sentencing in
several states, and compared the data they generously shared with each of
these lists. 103 The result is a detailed database of persons sentenced to death
from 1991 to 2016, which we are making available online as a research
resource.104 For data on death sentences before 1991, we have relied upon
data from the Broken System study led by Professors James Liebman, Valerie
West, and Jeff Fagan, which examined death sentences from 1973 through
the early 1990s. 10 5 This analysis includes 1990 data from that study.
2. Homicide Data
Death sentences are initially modeled as a function of four primary
independent variables. Homicide rates proxy the prevalence of sentencing-
eligible offenses within a given county. The two most commonly used
sources for homicide data-the Center for Disease Control (CDC) mortality
data from the National Vital Statistics System0 and the FBI Supplemental
Homicide Reports ("SHR") 0 7-pose various tradeoffs. Mortality data in the
CDC are derived primarily from coroners or medical examiner records, while
the SHR uses reports and other data filed with local police precincts. os The
CDC data is therefore more inclusive; there are many deaths that are never
102
Among those who shared data, we thank: the Arizona Capital Trial Project, the
California Appellate Project, the Georgia Resource Center, the Ohio Public Defender, the
Illinois Office of the State Appellate Defender, the Maryland Office of the Public Defender,
the Missouri Public Defender, North Carolina Center for Death Penalty Litigation, the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse and still additional individuals thanked in footnote *.
103 Michael Radelet generously shared 1990s data collected concerning Florida death
sentences. John Blume generously shared South Carolina data. David McCord and Talia
Harmon shared their national 1994, 2004, and 2014 data. As noted, Robert Smith shared data
collected from 2004-2015. Rob Warden shared Illinois data. Nicole Brambila and the Reading
Eagle shared Pennsylvania data.
104 The website is currently under construction.
105 Gelman et al., supra note 13, at 252-54. Because that study included only death
sentences for which appeals were finalized at the time the research was conducted, we
collected data going back to 1991.
106 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Mortality Data from the National Vital
Statistics System, MMWR (Mar. 3, 1989), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
00001356.htm.
107 See, e.g., Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Supplemental Homicide Reports Data:
2014, NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36393 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
108 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, The Nation's Two Measures of
Homicide 1-2 (July 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ntmh.pdf.
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reported to local law enforcement but are still processed by local healthcare
authorities as required by state laws in order to produce a death certificate. 109
However, critics contend that the CDC data is over-inclusive."0 In the
context of death penalty sentencing, the number of homicides documented
by police precincts are more relevant since they only focus on cases with
known offenders (cases more likely to result in arrests, prosecutions, and then
possible death sentences)."' In terms of data features, the clear advantage
lies with the SHR. While both data sources provide basic demographic
information about the victims, the SHRs also provide information about the
offenders and murder clearance rates. 112 For the sake of robustness, the
analysis therefore models homicide rates using estimates derived from both
data sources.
One important limitation of focusing on aggregate murder rates is that
not all murders are death-eligible. 113 Death eligibility can be an elusive
concept. Definitions of death eligibility vary from state to state. In many
states, the criteria include quite vague standards that provide prosecutors with
substantial discretion in deciding whether to seek the death penalty.1 4 Some
states have definitions of death-eligibility that are so broad that most murders
109 Id
no See, e.g., Pierce & Radelet, supra note 66, at 29.
1 See The Nation's Two Measures of Homicide, supra note 108; see also Homicide,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfin?ty-tp&tid=311 (last visited Sept. 13,
2017). The CDC also records between 2,500 and 3,000 additional homicides in 2011, due to
the September 11, 2001 attacks, which are omitted in FBI data. For an analysis of the
shortcomings of the SHR data, see Michael D. Maltz, Bridging Gaps in Police Crime Data,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 (1999), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/bgpcd.pdf.
112 CDC micro-level data were obtained from the Division of Vital Statistics at the
National Center for Health Statistics, a collaborative effort between the federal CDC and the
states. Homicides were flagged and aggregated at the county level for each year in the data.
Per our data sharing agreement, we cannot make public any individual county-level data for
counties with less than ten deaths in a given year. SHR data were adapted from the
aggregated dataset produced by Fox and Swatt for 1990-2007. James Alan Fox & Marc. L.
Swatt, The Recent Surge in Homicides Involving Young Black Males and Guns: Time to
Reinvest in Prevention and Crime Control (Dec. 2008), http://www.jfox.neu.edu/
Documents/Fox%20Swatt/`2OHomicide%2OReport%2ODec%20 2 9%2 020 08.pdf. Yearly
data files from 2008 onward were manually downloaded, cleaned, and aggregated. All SHR
data were obtained from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html.
113 For a discussion of death eligibility doctrine and statutes, see Chelsea Creo Sharon,
The "Most Deserving" of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of
Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 223 (2011).
114 See, e.g., Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(C) (2008) ("[C]onduct in committing the offense was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or aggravated battery to the victim.").
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are death eligible.115 Studies have found wide variation in how many murders
are death eligible, ranging from 20% to 90% of all murders. 1 16 The well-
known study led by Professor David Baldus of Georgia death sentences
found that 86% of murder convictions were death eligible.1 17 Thus, the
question whether a homicide is death eligible is not easy to answer, given
broad eligibility criteria in many states, and available evidence suggests that
varying, but sometimes quite large, percentages of homicides are death
eligible. Since it is not always obvious how to define death eligible
homicides, despite the limitations described, we have used unadjusted
homicide rates in this paper.
3. Race
The analysis also examines the effect of a county's racial composition
on sentencing behavior. Data on the proportion of a county's population that
is black or African-American are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. 18
A racial fragmentation measure also proxies racial demography within each
county. This alternative measure reports the probability that two randomly
selected individuals belong to different racial groups. 119  The racial
fragmentation variable is highly collinear with the black population share
variable, so that it is ill-advised to include both measures of racial
composition in the same model. For the sake of economizing on space, and
following general convention in the literature, the analysis defaults to the
black population share measure. The results are substantively similar across
both measures.
115 Marceau et al., supra note 65, at 1109.
See id. at 1109; Jeffrey Fagan et al., Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market
Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1803, 1824-26 (2006)
(finding national death eligibility rate of 25% based on FBI SHR data and slightly lower 21%
Texas rate); see also Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The
Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. ON RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 1, 8-9 (2004) (finding 21% death eligibility rate in Maryland);
Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The Calhfornia Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman,
72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1283, 1332 (1997) (finding 84% death eligibility rate in California).
117 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 11, at 268 n.3 1. (finding that 86% of crimes reported to the
FBI were death-eligible under Georgia's quite broad sentencing statute, while 65% of
convicted defendants were death-eligible). There may be still wider variation in individual
judgment whether a given defendant is the "worst of the worst" deserving the death penalty
under a given capital sentencing scheme. See Donohue, supra note 83, at 644-45.
118 U.S. Census Bureau Intercensal Estimates, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/
historical.index.html; http://www.census.gov/popest/
data/counties/asrh/2014/index.html. (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
The fragmentation measure is calculated using the three main racial categories reported
in the census data: white, black, other.
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4. Population Density
The third primary variable is the population density of each county,
measured as the number of persons per square mile. The inclusion of some
measure of density/urbanization is a common covariate in the literature.
Densely populated areas tend to have different patterns of social interaction,
political values and priorities, labor market dynamics, etc. than their rural
counterparts-all of which can be simultaneously correlated with covariates
in the analysis and the dependent variable. Population density is also a
suitable proxy for total population, since the two variables are highly
correlated. 120 Many studies use urbanization rates, but this analysis uses
population density for two principal reasons. First, the definition of urban
versus rural has changed over time, 121 which compromises the longitudinal
compatibility of the data (particularly since we hope to build upon this study
by including data from earlier time periods in the 1970s and 1980s). Second,
comprehensive inter-censal estimates of urbanization data at the county-level
are not readily available from the U.S. Census Bureau. Urbanization rates
would have to be interpolated for inter-censal years in the 1990s and early
2000s using snapshots taken at the 1990, 2000, and 2010 census. Any
estimates interpolated from so few data points would be of questionable
validity.
5. Income
Income per capita is the final primary independent variable considered
in the analysis. The death penalty is an expensive legal and judicial
enterprise,122 so this variable proxies the budgetary wherewithal of local law
enforcement and judicial systems. Income per capita also works as a crude
'catch-all' for other important socio-demographic data-such as political
attitudes (wealthier individuals tend to vote more conservatively) 123 and
education levels (wealthier individuals tend to have more years of formal
education) 124-that could exert influence over the dependent and other
120 The correlation coefficient between the logs of population density and total population
is r = .84. Ceterius paribus, more populous counties will have higher concentrations of people
living within a given geographic radius-in this case, persons per square mile.
121 For more information, see Urban and Rural, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
m For a collection of state and federal studies regarding the cost of the death penalty,
see Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty?did=108&scid=7 (last visited Sept. 13,
2017).
123 See, e.g., David Brady & Clem Brooks, Income, Economic Voting, and Long-Term
Political Change in the U.S., 1952-1996,77 Soc. FORCES 1339 (1999).
124 See, e.g., Thomas Lemieux, Postsecondary Education and Increasing Wage
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independent variables. This has the advantage of parsimoniously controlling
for many potentially relevant factors but the distinct disadvantage of
complicating efforts to interpret which mechanisms-or sets of
mechanisms-are represented in the regression coefficient on the income
variable. We would ideally want separate covariates for education,
partisanship, and other factors that would simultaneously be correlated with
income and death penalty sentencing, but resource constraints and data
availability issues prevented us from gathering the requisite statistics. We
will consider these factors more explicitly in subsequent analyses. Income
per capita data are calculated from population and income estimates provided
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.125
The four main independent variables described here are also
supplemented by conjecture-specific covariates in the analyses in the next
section. These variables explore the racial context of homicides as well as the
role of inertia in sentencing behavior over time. Specifics on the sources,
computation, and interpretation of these variables will be provided in context.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is also important to note that many of
the independent variables are heavily right-skewed in their distributions. 126
Failure to correct for skewness can prevent model convergence and/or result
in making invalid inferences when estimating using linear models. 127 As
such, all of the offending variables are log-transformed to help normalize
their distributions. 128
C. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Death sentencing is an extremely rare event. Roughly 95% of the
sampled county-years report no death sentences. This explains why the mean
number of sentences is 0.08 while the standard deviation is 0.48. The
negative binomial regression model is frequently used to model over-
dispersed, non-negative count outcomes. In this context, over-dispersion
means that the observed variance in the distribution of the dependent variable
Inequality, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 195 (2006).
125 Yearly income and population estimates taken from Local Area Personal Income
Accounts, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, Table CA30: Economic Profile,
https://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2016).
126 Income per capita, for instance, has a mean value of $25,800 but a standard deviation
of $9,900 and a range that spans $5,100 to $194,500.
127 JOHN Fox, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS & GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS 59 (3d
ed. 2016).
128 The log function is undefined at values <= 0, so many observations (e.g., county-years
with a homicide rate of 0) would be dropped from the analysis. To correct for this, arbitrary
start values (usually a value of "1") were added to the offending variables to ensure that each
variable to be transformed had a strictly positive, non-zero range of values.
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is greater than the dependent variable's average value. Alternative models
derived from the Poisson distribution assume no over-dispersion and will
subsequently under-predict the number of 0 counts in the sample.
An appropriate strategy also needs to model the longitudinal
dependence between the number of death sentences in county i at time t and
during all previous time periods (e.g., t - 1, t - 2, etc.), as well as the
hierarchical dependence between observations clustered within the same
state j. Failure to do so can generate invalid inferences on the basis of
incorrect coefficients and biased standard errors. As such, death sentences
are modeled using a mixed-effects conditionally-correlated regression
model. The number of death sentences in each county-year is modeled as a
function of a county-specific random-intercept, a panel of county-level
covariates, and fixed-intercepts for state and year to simultaneously control
for unobservable characteristics at the state level and trends with respect to
time. An alternative specification further isolates the influence of county-
level factors by fitting separate intercepts for each state-year in the dataset
(i.e., Alabama 1990, Alabama, 1991, Alabama 1992, etc.). This allows the
effects of time to vary across the unique domestic environment in each state.
The tradeoff is that this latter specification causes the number of additional
covariates to be estimated to grow from sixty-three (twenty-six intercepts for
time plus thirty-seven intercepts for each state in which the death penalty was
legal at some point between 1990 and 2016) to 949 distinct intercepts for
each state-year. The estimation of so many additional parameters
occasionally caused convergence issues, which are documented accordingly
in the results.
The conditionally-correlated regression model also includes time-
averaged values of all of county-level covariates in the model. This
approach-pioneered by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982)-uses the
addition of these time-averaged values to control for any observable
correlation between the county-effects and the independent variables in the
model. 129 This ensures that any remaining unobserved heterogeneity is
uncorrelated with the independent variables. An additional advantage of the
conditionally-correlated approach is that it relaxes the restriction found in a
traditional random effects approach whereby the within- and between-effects
of covariates are traditionally presented in the form of a weighted average.
This allows the analysis to explore effect heterogeneities in the covariates
within the same county over time (i.e., the within-effect) and between
counties on average (e.g., the between-effect).
129 Gary Chamberlain, Multivariate Regression Models for Panel Data, 18 J. OF
ECONOMETRICS 5 (1982); Yair Mundlak, On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section
Data, 46 ECONOMETRICA 69 (1978).
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II. FINDINGS: EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN DEATH SENTENCING
A. DESCRIPTIVE TRENDS
The modem death penalty era begins with the Supreme Court's ruling
in Furman v. Georgia, holding then-extant death penalty statutes
unconstitutional in 1972.130 In the years after that ruling, death sentences
rose sharply, reaching their modem height in the mid-1990s. However,
beginning in the late 1990s, death sentences began a steady fall. Death
sentences have declined by more than two-thirds since 2000. The figure
below shows these data. No one predicted that this decline would happen,
much less so deeply and so quickly.
130 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Fig. 1. Death Sentences in the United States, 1973-2016
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Where death sentences were regularly handed out in hundreds of
counties in the 1990s, including in small rural counties, today, death
sentences are concentrated in less than a dozen counties and chiefly in large,
densely populated counties. In the five years from 1996-2000, 536 counties
imposed death sentences. That dropped to 367 counties from 2001-2005,
304 from 2006-2010, and 203 counties that imposed death sentences from
2011-2015. In 2015, only thirty counties sentenced people to death and only
nine counties sentenced more than one person to death. In 2016, only twenty-
eight counties sentenced people to death and only one county, Los Angeles,
California, sentenced more than one person to death. The figure below
depicts this rise in the number of counties with death sentences in the mid-
1990s and the sharp drop in the numbers of counties imposing death
sentences in each year since the mid-1990s.
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Fig. 2. Number of Counties with Death Sentences, 1990-2016
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The handful of counties that still impose death sentences today mostly
consist of large counties. The average population (based on 2010 Census
figures) of the counties imposing death sentences in 2015 was over 1,000,000
people. Only two of the thirty counties that imposed death sentences had
fewer than 100,000 people. In Part II, we will explore these data in more
detail, examining population density and other demographics, to get a better
sense of why it is that so many fewer counties impose death sentences, and
what the characteristics of those counties are. The goal is to better understand
what is animating this remarkable social trend.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, crime fell across a wide range of
demographics and geographic areas and across all types of crimes, from
homicides to property crimes.131 America experienced a decline in homicides
in the early 1990s, continuing to the present, with only slight deviations. To
be sure, the decline is not perfectly even, and in some years there have been
spikes, such as in 2001 due to the September 11, 2001 attacks, in 2006-2007,
and most recently, with a spike in homicides in 2015. Over the entire time
period, the raw numbers of murders declined dramatically from almost
131 See generally Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four
Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. OF EcoN. PERSP. 163 (2004);
ZIMRING, supra note 19.
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25,000 in 1991 to fewer than 13,000 by 2010.132 The figure below illustrates
this trend using data from the CDC.
Fig. 3. The U.S. Homicide Rate Per 100,000 People, 1980-2014
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Death sentencing in the modem era in the U.S., from the 1970s through
the present, has become increasingly concentrated in a small number of
counties. Our goal was to examine what those counties have in common and
what factors might be correlated with this increased concentration in death
sentencing. While death sentencing has become more concentrated in the
group of top-death sentencing counties, it is those counties that have also
experienced the steepest drops in death sentencing. For the bulk of death
sentencing counties, even a single death sentence is an uncommon event. As
Professors James Liebman and Peter Clarke note, one might expect a smooth,
even decline in death sentencing in response, perhaps, to declining crime
rates, if death sentences were imposed rationally and consistently. However,
if death sentencing was always a practice unevenly and arbitrarily practiced,
that would not occur. Instead, as they observed in 2010, in a fairly rapid
fashion, "death sentencing is retreating to its bastions, as less frequent users
132 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics Online, tbl.6.79.2011, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6792011.pdf (last
visited Sept. 13, 2017).
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abandon the practice altogether." 133 What has changed since the time in
which they wrote is that death sentencing even in the "bastions" has declined.
We found that the top five counties experienced a sharp drop in death
sentencing from the mid 1990s through present. The next twenty-eight
counties experienced a more modest drop,1 34 as the figure below illustrates.
Fig. 4. Average Death Sentences Per County (1990-2016)
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Those sharp drops do not always correspond to any similarly sharp drop
in homicides. As the next figure shows, while the top five death sentencing
counties do have more homicides, the drop in homicides during the past
twenty years does not always mirror the drop in sentencing, particularly
during the early 1990s and again since the turn of the current decade.
133 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 331.
134 The cutoff for inclusion in this second tier was an average of at least one death sentence
a year between 1990 and 2016 (i.e., at least twenty-seven death sentences).
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Fig. 5. Average Homicides Per County (1990-2014)
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A plot of deviation scores between sentencing counts and homicide rates
confirms this pattern, as displayed in Figure 6. Each mark (circles in the case
of the top five sentencing counties and triangles for the second-tier counties)
represents the deviation score between the average, standardized values of
sentencing counts and homicide rates for each year in the dataset. As in
previous graphs, trend lines are also added to facilitate interpretation.
Positive values indicate that-relative to their average homicide rates-
counties sentenced a greater number of individuals to death. Negative values
indicate precisely the opposite: counties sentenced proportionally fewer
individuals to death than the level of their homicide rates would otherwise
suggest. While deviation scores are generally quite low and stable among the
second-tier sentencing counties, plotted values for the top five counties are
highly variable over time. The top five counties account for nearly 15% of
all death sentences issued under the period of investigation, so it is entirely
non-trivial that homicide rates do not always accurately mirror sentencing
counts.
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Fig. 6. Sentencing-Homicide Deviation Plot (1990-2014)
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The next figure examines the influence of homicides from a slightly
different perspective. Average homicide rates are disaggregated by whether
a county issued at least one death sentence (solid line) or not (dashed line)
each year between 1990-2014-the most recent year for which homicide
data from both the FBI and CDC are currently available. Homicide rates
exhibit a general decline over time, but two different stories emerge
depending on the data source used. The FBI data portray a quickly narrowing
gap between the sentencing and non-sentencing counties that begins in the
mid-2000s and narrows precipitously around 2010. By contrast, the CDC
data portray a relatively large-albeit slightly narrowing-gap in homicide
rates between the groups. This discrepancy is important because it suggests
that the choice of homicide indicator can have implications for any inferences
we wish to draw on the relationship between violent crime and death penalty
sentencing. The analysis will therefore consider the effects of homicide rates
derived from both data sources.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of County Homicide Rates
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Figures 8 and 9 compare sentencing and non-sentencing counties across
additional demographic (Figure 8) and economic (Figure 9) variables. Figure
8 reveals that sentencing counties appear to have more black, racially-
fragmented, densely-populated, and youthful populations. The demographic
gap between sentencing and non-sentencing counties has narrowed with
respect to racial composition, remained relatively constant regarding racial
fragmentation, and has actually widened with respect to density and age over
time.
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Fig. 8. Demographic Trends by Sentencing Status
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Economically, sentencing counties appear to be slightly stronger than
their non-sentencing counterparts. The sentencing group has higher average
income levels, lower poverty rates, and-at least until 2005-lower
unemployment rates.
Fig. 9. Economic Trend by Sentencing Status
Income per Cepita
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B. BASELINE ANALYSES
A series of regression results generally confirm-in a much more
empirically rigorous fashion-many of the impressions generated from the
preceding descriptive trends. Table 1 presents baseline negative binomial
regression results using homicide data respectively calculated from the SHR
and CDC and controls for the effects of state and time using two different
fixed-effects specifications. The number of death sentences in each county-
year is modeled as a function of the homicide rate, percentage of the
population that is black/African American, population density, and income
per capita. The coefficients in these and all subsequent regression tables are
presented in the form of factor changes. Coefficients with values less than
one indicate an expected decrease in the expected number of death sentences,
while coefficients with values greater than one indicate an expected increase
in the expected count. Factor changes can be transformed to percentage
changes by subtracting 1 from the observed coefficient value and multiplying
the result by 100.
THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY DECLINE
Table 1: Baseline Negative Binomial Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate 1.098*** 1.086* 1.107*** 1.083*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Percent black 1.388 1.377* 1.361* 1.343
pop. (0.157) (0.154) (0.167) (0.163)
Population 4.480*** 4.608 7.984** 8.704**
density (1.434) (1.510) (2.713) (3.040)
Income per 1.406 1.454 0.774 0.817
capita (0.599) (0.620) (0.359) (0.378)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate 1.526* 1.511 1.557* 1.535
(0.138) (0.127) (0.143) (0.130)
Percent black 1.122* 1.122* 1.118* 1.121**
pop. (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Population 2.230*** 2.196** 2.248 2.219*
density (0.089) (0.091) (0.088) (0.090)
Income per 1.018 1.175 0.998 1.142
capita (0.239) (0.288) (0.231) (0.275)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model Yes Yes Yes Yes
converged
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, * p<0.01, p<0.001
The analysis finds strong evidence that counties with proportionally
greater black populations and high population densities sentence more
individuals to death-both over time (i.e., the within-effect) and between
counties on average (i.e., the between-effect). A one-unit increase in the log
of the black share of a county's population increases the expected number of
death sentences within counties by an average factor of 1.4 and between
counties by an average factor of 1.1. Similarly, a one-unit increase in the log
of a county's population density increases the expected death sentence count
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by an average factor of 6.4 within counties and a factor of 2.2 between
counties. In both cases, the within-effects are larger than the between-effects.
This suggests that sentencing behavior is more sensitive to longitudinal
variations in a county's underlying demographic context than between
counties on average, at least with respect to these important demographic
characteristics. We consider more fully the implications of this in the next
section.
These initial results also support the conventional wisdom that
sentencing should be greater in more violent areas. The within- and between-
effects 35 of the homicide rates significantly and positively correlate with
death sentencing across all four models, but the magnitude of the within-
effects is substantively small. A one unit-increase in the logged homicide
rate only increases the expected number of death sentences within counties
by an average factor of 1.09, or 9%. By contrast, an equivalent increase
translates to an average factor increase of 1.53, or 53%, in the number of
expected death sentences between counties on average. In other words,
violent crime appears to exert greater leverage in explaining why some
counties generally sentence more people to death than others (i.e., the
between-effect) than in predicting whether a given county will sentence more
people to death over time (i.e., the within-effect).
The relationship between income per capita and sentencing is less
certain. Despite the fact that sentencing counties appeared to be slightly
wealthier than their non-sentencing counterparts (Figure 9), the income
variable is statistically insignificant across all models. Income may be highly
correlated with important omitted variables-such as education level 36 -
that may simultaneously influence earnings and attitudes towards death
penalty sentencing. Moreover, income may also proxy the resources with
which local law enforcement and judicial systems can pursue the death
penalty. The death penalty is an expensive proposition for local governments,
and many jurisdictions may lack the financial wherewithal to pursue it.137
Parsing out the distinct mechanisms between income/wealth and sentencing
The within-effect essentially seeks to assess whether an increase in a county's
homicide rate, black population share, population density, and/or income per capita would
make that county more or less likely to sentence more individuals to death over time. The
between-effect, by contrast, examines the effects of these variables in aggregate; on average,
do more violent, more black, more densely-population, and/or wealthier counties sentence
more individuals to death? This is an important empirical and substantive distinction. See
also our discussion of the empirical research strategy on page .
136 See generally Brooks & Brady, supra note 123.
137 For a collection of studies of state-wide costs of death sentencing, see State and
Federal Cost Studies, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-
penalty#financialfacts; see also infra notes 147-152.
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behavior is ultimately beyond the scope of this initial empirical foray into
modem sentencing behavior, but future work would do well to revisit the
political economy of death penalty sentencing with greater theoretical
precision and methodological rigor.
C. ANALYSIS OF DISAGGREGATED HOMICIDE RATES
The small within-effect of the homicide rate on sentencing in the
previous analysis suggests that total homicide rates may be too imprecise to
detect important nuances in any relationship between crime and sentencing.
The analysis now disaggregates homicide rates by racial group to assess the
presence of any "race-of-victim" effect, whereby deaths involving white
victims are more likely to result in the death penalty than when victims are
black. Table 2 reports these results.
GARRETT ET AL.
Table 2: Race of Victim Negative Binomial Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
White homicide
rate
Black homicide
rate
Percent black
pop.
Population
density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
White homicide
rate
Black homicide
rate
Percent black
pop.
Population
density
Income per capita
1.109-
(0.025)
1.059*
(0.030)
1.406**
(0.167)
4.264***
(1.321)
1.431
(0.607)
2.173***
(0.254)
0.943
(0.085)
1.295***
(0.081)
2.169***
(0.085)
1.169
(0.278)
1.108
(0.026)
1.039
(0.030)
1.423**
(0.166)
4.518***
(1.489)
1.427
(0.611)
2.243***
(0.240)
0.965
(0.077)
1.254***
(0.070)
2.129***
(0.089)
1.530+
(0.379)
1.123
(0.027)
1.066*
(0.031)
1.385*
(0.180)
7.263**
(2.357)
0.782
(0.363)
2.223***
(0.262)
0.948
(0.085)
1.295***
(0.081)
2.179***
(0.084)
1.164
(0.274)
1.109
(0.026)
1.030
(0.029)
1.400*
(0.179)
8.448
(2.957)
0.786
(0.366)
2.286
(0.246)
0.966
(0.076)
1.255
(0.069)
2.148**
(0.087)
1.504+
(0.368)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, p<0.05, * p<0.01, "* p<0.001
The differences in racial homicide rates are striking. Although the
within-effects are still substantively small, the magnitude of a one-unit
increase in the white homicide rate is between two and three times greater
than in the case of the black homicide rate. Moreover, the within-effect of
the white homicide rate is robust across all four models, while the effect of
the black homicide rate only passes a lower-threshold of statistical
significance (p < 0.05) in the case of the FBI homicide data.
In the case of the between-effects, counties with greater white homicide
rates sentence substantially more individuals to death, on average. The
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between-effect of the white homicide rate corresponds to an expected
increase in sentencing by an average factor of 2.2, or 120%. By contrast, the
between-effect of the black homicide rate is not significantly different from
zero in any of the models.
D. ANALYSIS OF LAGGED HOMICIDE RATES
We examine the influence of homicide rates from a third perspective by
considering the time delay between arrests and punishments in the American
criminal justice system. According to the data we have collected, which is
not complete regarding dates of homicides, but provides a rough average
across a number of states, the average processing time from the date of the
homicide to death sentencing was over a year. If true, it may be more
reasonable to assume that sentencing decisions reflect some combination of
the current and/or historical crime environment. Table 3 re-estimates the
baseline regressions using a one-year lag of the total homicide rate using the
FBI and CDC data. The substantive implications of a one-unit increase in
the lagged homicide rate upon sentencing behavior over time are now greater
than in either of the previous modeling approaches. The within-effect of a
growth in the lagged homicide rate now increases the expected number of
death sentences by an average factor of 1.27, or 27%. The between-effect of
the lagged homicide rate is also statistically-significant across all four
models, with substantively similar interpretation when compared to the
contemporaneous homicide rates used in Table 1.
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Table 3: 1-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at 1.234 1.283 1.300 1.282
t-1 (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Percent black 1.349 1.338* 1.318* 1.311'
pop. (0.153) (0.153) (0.163) (0.163)
Population 4.629*** 4.885"' 7.826*** 8.830***
density (1.495) (1.614) (2.705) (3.124)
Income per capita 1.382 1.412 0.745 0.774
(0.599) (0.600) (0.354) (0.359)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at 1.519 1.507 1.550 1.529
t-1 (0.138) (0.127) (0.142) (0.129)
Percent black 1.120" 1.119" 1.115** 1.118*
pop. (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Population 2.204"' 2.170"' 2.212"' 2.191
density (0.088) (0.090) (0.086) (0.088)
Income per capita 1.023 1.160 1.012 1.133
(0.240) (0.283) (0.233) (0.272)
Observations 62,800 62,794 62,800 62,794
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001
The analysis also measures the effect of past violent crime by taking a
three-year moving average of the homicide rate (Table 4 below). The results
again confirm the positive association between homicide rates and death
sentencing counts, as well as the uptick in the substantive within-effect of the
homicide rate as compared to the baseline analysis reported in Table 1.
Further robustness checks using different lag specifications yield
substantively similar results. 138 The results of these supplementary
138 Models using two-year, three-year, four-year, and five-year lags of the logged
homicide rate, as well as a five-year moving average, were also estimated.
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regressions are reported in the Appendix. The effects of racial demography
and population density are again consistent across all of these models.
Table 4: 3-Year Moving Average Homicide Rate Negative
Binomial Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate (3- 1.217*** 1.454** 1.328*** 1.430*
yr moving avg.) (0.041) (0.072) (0.055) (0.065)
Percent black 1.366* 1.387* 1.328 1.997
pop. (0.154) (0.168) (0.163) (0.221)
Population 4.747** 6.040*** 8.104** 8.706*
density (1.542) (2.164) (2.811) (2.388)
Income per capita 1.382 1.167 0.747 0.867
(0.597) (0.529) (0.355) (0.420)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate (3- 1.534** 1.485** 1.561** 1.483*
yr moving avg.) (0.139) (0.125) (0.143) (0.063)
Percent black 1.118* 1.126 1.113 1.163
pop. (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.026)
Population 2.227"* 2.227*** 2.238** 2.108**
density (0.088) (0.094) (0.087) (0.044)
Income per capita 1.033 1.099 1.020 0.898
(0.244) (0.277) (0.237) (0.124)
Observations 62,790 60,342 62,790 60,342
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p<.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
E. PATH DEPENDENCY IN DEATH SENTENCING
The findings regarding lag times in homicide processing relates to an
additional analysis of inertia within counties over time. We suspected that
previous sentencing behavior would cast a long shadow over current
sentencing decisions. Not only does time pass between the murder and a
death sentence, but prior preferences and outcomes may shape current
preferences and outcomes. An initial distribution of policy preferences and
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resources may predispose some prosecutor's offices to achieve early
successes in seeking and obtaining the death penalty. Once an office
assembles a staff that has handled a capital trial, it draws upon this capacity
to pursue the death penalty in subsequent cases, which further augments the
office's institutional capacity to pursue the death penalty. This self-
reinforcing dynamic between capacity and caseload makes it more likely for
offices that obtain death sentences to seek the death penalty going forward.
Conversely, offices that cease to obtain death penalties (or never obtained
death penalties in the first place) may be less likely to reverse course as
institutional capacity for death penalty sentencing erodes (or is never
developed).
We found a highly significant relationship between the sum of all prior
death sentences and current-year sentencing (Table 5). We also found a
similar relationship between the share of all previous years in which a county
sentenced at least one person to death and current-year sentencing (Table 6).
In both cases, counties with a proven history of sentencing are more likely to
issue more death sentences-both over time and on average. The within-
effect of sentencing inertia is particularly large in both tables.
This effect may not just be a prosecution effect. This path dependency
may reflect practices of prosecutors who make the charging decisions
whether to seek the death penalty, but it may also capture defense lawyering,
judges, jurors, and other features of a county that make it more likely to
continue to death sentence over time.
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Table 5: Sum of All Prior Sentences Negative Binomial
Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Cumulative death 53.030** 53.318** 59.019*** 58.923
sentences (12.239) (12.307) (12.716) (12.781)
Homicide rate 1.054 1.057* 1.092*** 1.051+
(0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Percent black 1.749* 1.790** 1.514** 1.569***
pop. (0.144) (0.149) (0.136) (0.146)
Population 1.608 1.585 1.811 1.813*
density (0.519) (0.503) (0.524) (0.522)
Income per capita 1.845 1.819 1.123 1.095
(0.708) (0.708) (0.463) (0.462)
Between-Effects
Cumulative death 2.842 2.790** 2.870 2.803**
sentences (0.125) (0.124) (0.122) (0.121)
Homicide rate 0.796 0.859* 0.774* 0.845'
(0.050) (0.053) (0.049) (0.054)
Percent black 1.053+ 1.032 1.060 1.035
pop. (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Population 1.129* 1.138*** 1.117 1.134*
density (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Income per capita 0.925 0.918 0.907 0.901
(0.141) (0.146) (0.143) (0.149)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ' p<0.001
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Table 6: Share of Years with at Least 1 Death Sentence Negative
Binomial Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Sentencing share 90.172*** 90.063" 107.811 96.722"'
ofyears (14.811) (14.809) (15.459) (13.546)
Homicide rate 0.985 0.964 1.010 0.966
(0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Percent black 1.087 1.095 1.008 0.980
pop. (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.153)
Population 2.717* 2.754' 1.996' 2.054*
density (0.897) (0.915) (0.663) (0.694)
Income per capita 1.190 1.197 0.754 0.641
(0.476) (0.478) (0.314) (0.304)
Between-Effects
Sentencing share 3.776 3.763 3.865 3.882
of years (0.209) (0.208) (0.216) (0.241)
Homicide rate 1.087 1.127+ 1.113 1.189'
(0.077) (0.078) (0.081) (0.091)
Percent black 1.018 1.006 1.013 1.004
pop. (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Population 1.297*' 1.288"' 1.296** 1.298**
density (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.060)
Income per capita 0.791 0.839 0.809 0.812
(0.155) (0.168) (0.163) (0.204)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001
F. ROBUST RESULTS
Before discussing the implications of these findings, it is important to
note that all of these analyses were subject to several robustness checks.
First, all models were re-specified using a series of Poisson regressions.
While it is generally acknowledged that the negative binomial regression
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model is the preferred choice when estimating overdispersed counts, the
tradeoff between the negative binomial and Poisson regression models grows
more complicated in the context of longitudinal, hierarchically arranged data.
Counties are observed repeatedly over time between 1990 and 2016, and
counties are nested within states. For instance, a random-effects negative
binomial regression uses the same parameter to predict both the county-
specific random intercept and the amount of over-dispersion in the data. In
practice, this means that it is not possible to have heterogeneity at the county-
level without also having over-dispersion at the county-year-level (or vice
versa). This is problematic if the data are over-dispersed at some levels of the
dependent variable but not at others. 139 For these and similar reasons, Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal do not recommend the use of random-effects negative
binomial models.'o Additionally, work by Cameron and Trivedi contends
that the efficiency gains of the negative binomial over the Poisson regression
are less noticeable when modeling longitudinal data. 141
Second, models were re-estimated using their original, untransformed
values. Transformation is a common practice in the literature because it can
facilitate model convergence and mathematically-express theoretically-
important distributions, such as the decreasing marginal utility of income. 142
However, variable transformations can occasionally generate non-trivial
deviations from the original distributions of key covariates. The relationships
observed in the previous analyses could thus be artifacts of the transformation
process. This is especially true when arbitrary start values are added to the
data to avoid taking the log of 0, as is the case for many of the homicide rate
variables. 143
Finally, we re-estimate models by periodizing the results into five-year
increments. 1" This helps detect any temporal heterogeneities in the effects
among the covariates. These models are estimated using traditional-mixed
effects negative binomial regressions with random county-effects and fixed
effects for each state and year. The shorter time horizon within each period
139 SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL
MODELING USING STATA 712 (3d ed. 2012).
140 Id
141 A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 133
(2d ed. 2013). We nonetheless feature negative binomial regressions in the main body of the
article because it follows common practice in previous scholarship examining longitudinal
determinants of death sentencing across counties and states. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note
13.
142 Fox, supra note 127.143 See supra note 128.
144 Results are disaggregated into the following periods: 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-
2004; 2005-2009; 2010-2014.
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(five years) does not warrant disaggregating the effects into their constituent
within and between components as in the conditionally-correlated models
used in the remainder of the analysis since most of the detectable variation
will be cross-sectional (i.e., between counties instead of within them).
The results of these various robustness checks are listed, along with
basic descriptive statistics, in the Appendix. Re-estimation using the Poisson
distribution yielded substantively similar results, but the use of the originally-
scaled, non-transformed covariates produces a slightly more muddled
understanding of the key relationships in the study.
On the one hand, these non-transformed analyses generally confirm
previously identified relationships regarding the between-effect of all
contemporaneously-measured homicide rates, the influence of lagged
homicide rates, and the effect of population density. The role of racial
demography, the presence of a race of victim effect, and the role of
sentencing inertia are partially-reaffirmed. Racial composition is more
strongly associated with increased sentencing within counties than between
them, while the strong disparity between white and black homicide rates and
sentencing persists more strongly between counties than within them.
Measuring inertia as the share of years where at least one individual was
sentenced to death produces results that are more consistent with the main
empirical findings than using the cumulative share of all death sentences. On
the other hand, the effect of income is completely different than before; a
strong positive association with sentencing is now identified within most
models, particularly in the case of the between-effect.145
Results from the final robustness check using an expanded set of
covariates using multiple imputation validate this claim. The effects of the
homicide rate (contemporaneous, disaggregated by victim, and lagged),
racial demography, and population density are largely internally-consistent
across each of the five periods and generally mirror the substantive
implications of the main analysis. The effect of income per capita is more
variable across periods, but this comports with the lack of consistent and
significant results found in the main analysis.
III. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY FINDINGS
In this Part, we discuss the implications of these findings. The first
sections discuss each of the main findings described in Part II, beginning with
145 We caution that drawing general conclusions from this second set of robustness checks
is difficult since many of these models failed to converge because of the non-linearities
introduced when using the covariates in their originally-scaled forms. These results and their
accompanying discussion are included mainly in the interest of transparency.
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the findings concerning population density, race, and then the findings
regarding homicide rates and path dependency in death sentencing. This Part
then concludes by discussing larger implications for death penalty research
and for litigation.
A. POPULATION DENSITY FINDINGS
The above analysis describes a consistent and strong relationship
between population density and death sentencing. Take as an example the
state of Virginia, in which in the 1980s and 1990s, dozens of small counties
regularly imposed death sentences.146 In the past decade only seven counties
imposed any death sentences, and most were large, densely populated
counties, like Fairfax County, the largest county in Virginia, and Virginia
Beach, the largest city in Virginia.1 4 7
It may be that large counties are more likely to absorb the costs of
seeking the death penalty, which may be borne in part by local prosecutors,
courts, and law enforcement, as well as local public defenders. Costs of death
penalty cases can be enormous. A Maryland study found costs in cases
resulting in death sentences averaged $3 million per case and the cost to state
taxpayers of the death penalty would be $186 million.1 4 8 Colorado came close
to abolishing the death penalty in 2009 due to concern with the $4 million a
year in costs, despite a small death row.1 4 9 In Georgia, a death penalty trial
ran up over $3 million in just the defense costs. 15o The State of New York
estimated that the death penalty cost $1.8 million per case, for trials and then
appeals.15 1 In North Carolina, it cost $11 million per year to litigate death
penalty cases through trial from 2007 to 2008, when there were twenty-five
capital trials and just four death sentences.152 Those costs fall on prosecutors,
but also the courts, prisons, public defenders' offices, and others, like state
attorney generals who must typically defend appeals and post-conviction
146 For a description of this pattern and a case study of the decline in Virginia death
sentencing, see GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4.
147 Id at 6.
48 JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
MARYLAND 2 (2008), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625 _nd_deathjpenalty.pdf.
"49 Morgan Carroll & Paul Weissmann, Editorial, Revisit Death Penalty Bill, DENVER
POST (May 21, 2009), http://www.denverpost.com/2009/05/20/revisit-death-penalty-bill/.
150 Steve Visser & Rhonda Cook, Nichols' Defense Costs $3.2 Million - State, Fulton
County Had to Foot the Bill, ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 22, 2009) at B 1.
151 Kelly Phillips Erb, Considering The Death Penalty: Your Tax Dollars At Work,
FORBES (May 1, 2014) https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/05/01/
considering-the-death-penalty-your-tax-dollars-at-work/#cbl066664b3d.
152 Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North
Carolina, 11 AM. L. AND ECON. REv. 498, 498 (2009).
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proceedings. While we observed strong population density effects, 153 the
effect of income per capita was largely insignificant in the analysis.
Nevertheless, the existence of a resource effect is still probable. The effect
of income is likely correlated with other factors-such as education or
partisanship-and income data may not be the most valid proxy for the
resource capacity of local criminal justice systems.
B. RACE OF VICTIM AND DEMOGRAPHIC FINDINGS
The findings regarding the consistent effects of the percentage of black
population in counties, as well as the findings regarding the association
between murders with white victims and death sentencing, add to the large
body of evidence regarding race discrimination in death sentencing that has
steadily accumulated since the Supreme Court declined to place any
constitutional weight on the findings of the landmark Baldus study in its 1987
ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp. 154 We are examining the characteristics of all
homicides in counties and not just the particular cases resulting in death
sentences. Indeed, researchers have found still larger disparity in the race of
victims in cases in which there is ultimately an execution; among those cases
a disturbing 75% of the cases involved only white victims. 155 What these
data add is national data, across all death-sentencing states, over a twenty-
five year time period. Of course, as described, the Baldus findings have also
been replicated in intensive studies of almost every state's death sentencing,
with empirical work examining the characteristics of all murders or death
eligible murders in each given state. 56 These data do add something to that
already troubling picture, by confirming that even in an era of declining death
sentencing, concerns about race discrimination persist, and they continue to
be centered around race-of-victim effects.
C. HOMICIDE RATE FINDINGS
We identify a positive association between homicide rates and death
sentencing. The national decline in homicide rates should have reduced the
153 For instance, the results from Table 1 report that-on average-a one-unit increase in
the log of population density was associated with nearly a 570% increase the expected number
of death sentences within counties and roughly a 120% increase between counties.
154 481 U.S. 279, 287-91 n.6 (1987).
155 Professor Frank Baumgartner has collected data on executions in the United States
from 1976 through 2015. Examining that data, one observes that among the 1,422 people
executed in the United States from 1976 through 2015, 15% or 210 of 1422 involved at least
one black victim. In contrast, 75% or 1070 of the 1,422 cases involved only white victims.
Baumgartner, supra note 17.
156 See, e.g., Grosso et al., supra note 11; U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 11. For an
additional overview, see David C. Baldus et al., supra note 80, at 500-01.
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supply of cases that could result in death sentences across all counties-and
we generally find empirical evidence that supports this intuition. Although
the concordance between homicide rates and death sentencing is far from
exact (see Figures 4, 5, and 6 for an empirical overview), the two variables
do tend to mirror each other: a rise or decline in one generally corresponds
with a similar response in the other. These results were consistent across the
FBI and CDC data sources, and we also found strong evidence of a race-of-
victim effect. A one-unit increase in the logged white homicide rate
corresponded with an average increase in the expected number of death
sentences by 11% within counties and 123% between counties. By contrast,
the effect of a one-unit increase in the logged black homicide rate was
generally insignificant-both with respect to the within- and between-effects.
However, the between-effects of the homicide rate were generally of
larger substantive value than the within-effects. This could be because key
local preferences and idiosyncrasies overshadow or-at least-heavily
moderate the objective influence of a changing homicide rate upon
sentencing behavior within a given county over time. Future research would
do well to explore this possibility in greater detail. The relationship between
homicide rates and sentencing was stronger-particularly within counties-
when lagging homicide rates by one to three years. After all, it takes time for
an investigation and a trial to result in a death sentence.
However, this lag may also overlap with the path dependent preferences
of death sentencing counties. As described, those that obtain death sentences
become far more likely to do so again. These results together suggest that
preferences at the county level, and not purely the supply of murders, drive
death sentencing. Whether death sentences are handed down may depend, as
Professor James Liebman and Peter Clark put it, on "the practices, policies,
habits, and political milieu of local prosecutors, jurors, and judges that dictate
whether a given defendant in the United States-whatever his crime-will
be charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced capitally and executed."157 We
cannot say whether the patterns observed are due to prosecutors' preferences,
or those of jurors, judges, or defense lawyers, as well. We can only observe
that there are these significant associations between death sentencing and
factors like population, race, lagged murder rates, and prior death sentences
over time.
D. EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia, the federal
courts have been occupied with whether under the Eighth Amendment, death
157 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 262.
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sentencing is "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed.'5 8 Yet the Supreme Court
has not closely considered statistical studies of death sentencing since it
rejected the findings of the Baldus study in McCleskey.159 Perhaps given the
Justices' prior rulings, it is less likely that "data-driven arbitrariness review"
will take on a more prominent role, even with the benefit of detailed new
county-level data on death sentencing.' 60 While evidence of racial
discrimination in death sentencing has not been carefully and directly
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court since McCleskey,161 a different type
of empirical debate has played an increasingly prominent role in the Court's
rulings-a debate concerning evidence of the rarity and arbitrariness of
particular death penalty practices.
In its Eighth Amendment rulings concerning "evolving standards of
decency" and the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has
highlighted how few states or how few death sentences have been carried out
for certain types of defendants as "objective indicia of national consensus"
concerning the form of punishment. 162 In 1988 in Thompson v. Oklahoma, a
plurality of the Justices concluded the Eighth Amendment barred execution
of an individual who was less than sixteen years-old at the time of the offense;
at the time thirty-two legislatures barred the practice and none had permitted
it explicitly.1 6 3 However, in 1989 in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that
execution of the intellectually disabled was permitted where "the two state
statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to
the fourteen States that have rejected capital punishment completely, [did]
not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus." 6 In the
same year, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court concluded that where twenty-
two of thirty-seven death penalty states permitted the death penalty for
sixteen year-old offenders, and twenty-five permitted it for seventeen year-
olds, there was no national consensus "sufficient to label a particular
punishment cruel and unusual."165
408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 207 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 264, 276 (1976).
159 481 U.S. 279, 287-91 n.6 (1987).
I6 Smith, supra note 4, at 254. Professor Smith also calls for the collection of still more
detailed charging data regarding all potentially capital cases and examining what factors
influenced processing and outcomes. Id. at 256.
161 An exception was U.S. v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002), in which the Court, in a per
curiam opinion, rejected as insufficient evidence regarding race disparity in federal death
sentencing.
162 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563-64 (2005).
163 487 U.S. 815, 827-29 (1988).
164 492 U.S. 302, 334, 371 (1989).
165 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
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The state of national consensus had changed by the time Atkins v.
Virginia was decided in 2002. The Court noted sixteen states had barred the
death penalty for the intellectually disabled-and even in those states where
the death penalty for the intellectually disabled was permitted, such death
sentences were rare, with only five states having done so since 1989-the
death penalty for the intellectually disabled was "truly unusual, and it is fair
to say that a national consensus has developed against it."l6 6 In Ring v.
Arizona, the Court noted how "the great majority of States responded to this
Court's Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating
circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the
,,167jury.
In abolishing the juvenile death penalty in its 2005 ruling in Roper v.
Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court described how even fewer states permitted
the juvenile death penalty as compared to the intellectually disabled. 168
Thirty states prohibited the juvenile death penalty. 169 Although twenty states
did not formally prohibit it, the execution of juveniles was so infrequent that
few examples could be identified in recent years.1 70 To be sure, the Justices
noted that the "rate of change" regarding the juvenile death penalty was
slower than the rate of change concerning the death penalty for the
intellectually disabled.171 Yet the Court emphasized the "consistency in the
direction of change" during those years.1 7 2 Dissenting in Roper v. Simmons,
Justice Antonin Scalia argued: "Words have no meaning if the views of less
than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus." In
its ruling in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment barred executing an individual for a person who raped but did
not kill a child.1 74 The Court noted that the last known person executed for
that crime was in 1964, and while forty-four states and the federal
government barred the death penalty for child rape, only six states did. 75
The Court has considered not just state-level practices, but local
practices, although not county-level differences per se. Justice Scalia noted
in his dissent: "[W]e have, in our determination of society's moral standards,
166 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
167 536 U.S. 584, 607-08 (2002).
168 543 U.S. 551, 577-78 (2005).
169 Id. at 564.
170 Id at 565.
11Id.
172 Id
173 Id at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2008).
175 Id. at 423.
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consulted the practices of sentencing juries: Juries 'maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system' that this Court cannot
claim for itself." 176 The marked reluctance of juries, even more so in the past
decade, to impose death sentences across the country adds some power to the
Eighth Amendment argument in favor of abolition. The Court argued in
rulings like Atkins v. Virginia that there may be little need for states in which
no executions have been carried out in decades, to reconsider their death
penalty statutes. 177 The same may be true of states in which the death penalty
exists on the books, but there have been no death sentences for years.
Eighth Amendment concerns should be heightened today now that in
the thirty-one states in which the death penalty exists on the book, only a
handful of counties still sentence persons to death. In 2016, only thirteen
states imposed death sentences-and only twenty-six counties. F or the
entire period from 2010-2016, only sixteen counties imposed more than five
death sentences.1 7 9 Those constitute only .005% of the approximately 3,000
counties in the United States. The rate of change and the "consistency in the
direction of change" in the past two decades is marked.so Perhaps the Court
will engage with these county-level data in analyzing objective indicia of
contemporary values in the future.
That said, decisions like Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy dealt with specific
categories of capital defendants and not the broader argument that the entire
death penalty is now a rare and arbitrary event in this country. The Court
turned decades ago from examining particular methods of execution to death
sentencing more broadly: it is not a stretch for the Court to engage with the
troubled state of American death sentencing.1st However, the Court in
McCleskey v. Kemp, declined to rule in favor of the inmate based on the
findings of the Baldus Study regarding death sentencing in Georgia.1 82 In
7 Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("Legislative 'policy' is thus necessarily defined not by what is
legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so
regularly conferred upon them.").
1 See, e.g., 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
178 See Bazelon, supra note 3, at 43-44; see also GARRETT, END OF rrs ROPE, supra note
4, at Ch. 6.
179 Garrett, End of its Rope, supra note 4, at Ch. 6.
180 Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976) ("In the earliest cases raising Eighth
Amendment claims, the Court focused on particular methods of execution to determine
whether they were too cruel to pass constitutional muster. The constitutionality of the sentence
of death itself was not at issue.").
182 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
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McCleskey, the Court addressed two questions: first, whether discriminatory
purpose could be inferred from a statewide policy or practice of
discrimination, and second, the Eighth Amendment question whether this
evidence provided evidence of arbitrariness.1 8 3  Regarding the Eighth
Amendment claim, the Court assumed that the findings of the Baldus study
were valid, but nevertheless found them inadequate to show that the Georgia
death penalty system operated in an arbitrary manner, including that although
there is "some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision," the state
statutes had already been approved by the Court for the manner in which they
guided discretion to jurors.'1' The Court also emphasized that "[a]pparent
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system,"
so that the Justices would not "assume that what is unexplained is invidious,"
particularly where the discretion involved could call "into serious question
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system."' 85 For Equal
Protection purposes, the Court emphasized that "decisions whether to
prosecute and what to charge necessarily are individualized."9 86
Perhaps the findings in this study concerning the role of race and the
race of victims would have less impact than the classic Baldus study, which
had the advantages of remarkable comprehensive detail regarding all murder
cases in a state. The findings in this study similarly show arbitrariness and
bias in the operation of the discretionary features of our criminal justice
system. This study involves nationwide data and not data concerning just
one state. However, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in United States v. Bass,
a case challenging race discrimination in the federal death penalty, real
discomfort with "a nationwide showing" of statistics regarding race in death
sentencing. s8 To be sure, a renewed Eighth Amendment argument based on
data from this study and a substantial body of research that has accumulated
since the time of McCleskey, could proceed differently. A modem analysis
would ask whether arbitrariness of several types, as to prosecutorial charging,
race discrimination, defense resources, local geography, each contribute to
cruel and unusual punishment. That arbitrariness is manifest at the local
level, as well as in patterns observed across counties nationally.
A response might be that observed county-level variation in
enforcement, if it does not amount to unconstitutional race discrimination, is
not of constitutional concern since it is built into our localized system of
enforcement. Kent Scheidegger has argued "so-called geographic disparity"
183 Id. at 301-11.
184 Id. at 308-09.
185 Id. at 315.
18 Id. at 295.
187 536 U.S. 862 (2002).
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is not a problem "on the same order as race discrimination," and in fact any
such concern runs "flatly contrary to the American tradition of local
control."188 The Supreme Court emphasized as much in McCleskey, in its
discussion of why local discretion by prosecutors and jurors is essential to
criminal justice. 189 Of course, we observe racially disparate patterns in death
sentencing and we observe local inertia unconnected to any comparatively
greater degree or homicide victimization. These are not common and local
policy preferences, but biased preferences of a small handful of counties.
A slightly different Eighth Amendment argument based on geographic
disparity and infrequency has now been posed at the Supreme Court. In 2014,
in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, calling for further consideration of the
question whether the death penalty has become categorically
unconstitutional, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, emphasized that
the death penalty has "increasingly become unusual," having "declined
rapidly" in the last fifteen years, raising heightened Eighth Amendment
concerns. 190 He explained: "Geography also plays an important role in
determining who is sentenced to death . . . Between 2004 and 2009, for
example, just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country)
accounted for approximately half of all death sentences imposed
nationwide."' 91
That reasoning could be buttressed by these findings concerning the
relationship between population density, race, and the complex relation of
lagged homicide rates and path dependency that explains death sentencing in
those few counties that still engage in the practice.192 Justice Breyer
emphasized in his Glossip dissent the concern with arbitrariness not just due
to the role of local geography but that county-by-county disparity might be
caused by troubling factors such as availability of resources for defense
counsel, political pressures, and "racial composition of and distribution
within a county." 93
Thus, in cases like Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, the Supreme Court has
l8 Kent Scheidegger, Smoke and Mirrors on Race and the Death Penalty, 4 ENGAGE 42,
44 (2003).
189 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987).
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2757 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191 Id
192 For an in-depth discussion of the questions raised by a broader definition of Eighth
Amendment arbitrariness, see Kovarsky, supra note 4, at 328-330. One question Kovarsky
raises is whether "residing in the wrong county" should be considered arbitrary. Id. at 329.
The analysis here suggested that further "irrelevant variables" are associated with the
reduction and concentration of death sentencing, including variables like race that the Court
has already recognized as associated with arbitrariness concerns. Id.
193 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2758.
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recognized Eighth Amendment violations for practices used by far more
states than the current death penalty, which is now maintained by just a
scattered collection of counties. Today, the majority of states with the death
penalty on the books do not impose death sentences and even fewer have
executions; 19 4 the story is still more powerful when one focuses on counties.
Death sentences are now at the same low-point they had reached just before
the Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia.19 5 Whether other Justices will
agree, along with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, that further briefing on this
issue is warranted and that new Eighth Amendment concerns now exist, time
will tell. However, these findings suggest that the splintered geography and
infrequency of county-level death sentencing are only part of the problem:
far more troubling are the characteristics of those counties that
disproportionately engage in death sentencing, including that they exhibit
bias towards urban centers, racially biased sentencing patterns, and
substantial path dependency.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DEATH PENALTY TRENDS
These data suggest that the death penalty will continue its steady
decline. To be sure, death penalty trends have reversed themselves in the
past; death sentences increased dramatically following the Supreme Court's
ruling in Furman, and they continued to increase through the 1990s.1 96
However, the decline in death sentencing has been two decades in the
making, and a reversal might take some time. These trends are therefore
likely to persist, even if the portion of death sentencing that is linked to
homicide rates may change if homicide rates increase in the future.
The decline in death sentencing is international and not limited to the
United States. The concern with arbitrariness in death sentencing is reflected
in not just the Eighth Amendment but in international treaties. Article 6 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that:
"Every human being has the inherent right to life," and that "[n]o one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 19 7 As Professor David Garland has
described, we live in a global "age of abolition," and around the world, as
countries have made the death penalty a subject for national and not local
194 See The Death Penalty in 2016: Year End Report 4, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(2016), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf (noting that in 2016, thirteen
states and twenty-seven counties imposed death sentences, while only seven states conducted
executions).
195 Id. at 1.
196 Id.
197 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21, U.N.
GOAR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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regulation, death sentences have been limited and the penalty itself
abolished. 198 Where the death penalty persists, however, it is because it
presents political opportunities for local stakeholders. In the U.S., those
opportunities appear to be fading.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The county-level death penalty decline has implications for debates
about localism in criminal justice more broadly. We have described how
more counties have stopped seeking or successfully obtaining death
sentences. Professor Adam Gershowitz has argued that perhaps the counties'
role in death sentencing should be eliminated entirely-that a broader
constituency should decide whether death sentences are merited, such as a
state capital prosecutor.199 Professors Stephen Smith and James Liebman
have responded that it is state subsidization that enabled the rise in death
sentences in the first place.200 A common ground on both sides of that
argument is that all agree that local counties should not be able to shunt the
costs of expensive capital litigation on the rest of the state without
internalizing many of those cases.201 Perhaps one reason the death penalty
decline has been so sharp is that the counties that pursue death sentences most
aggressively have had to bear more of the costs.
In some cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized how deference to "the
vagaries of state criminal law" can result in a "crazy quilt" rather than
"uniform law of the land." 2 02 Perhaps constitutional criminal procedure
should more generally be sensitive to potentially arbitrary variation in
enforcement. If something as grave as capital punishment can be so sensitive
to local prosecution priorities, then that raises the question whether and why
we tolerate such widely varying imposition of other types of punishments,
such as life without parole.
A series of reforms could improve state-level support for criminal
justice and minimize local arbitrariness, and not just for death sentencing.
Nineteen states and localities have enacted "smart on crime" justice
198 GARLAND, supra note 3, at 11.
199 Adam Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties'
Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REv. 307, 324 (2010).
200 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 312. Smith, supra note 4, at 236 ("The fact that
the political decision to perform an execution is one step removed from the citizens in the
county who imposed the sentence means that it is possible for a backlog of executions to
remain even though local taste for capital punishment has subsided.").
201 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 312.
202 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh, 548
U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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reinvestment measures designed to reduce sentences, expand parole, and
203reinvest cost savings in alternatives to incarceration. Reducing mass
incarceration, since the vast majority of prisoners are imprisoned in state
facilities, will require interventions at the state level.20 Many states and
localities are beginning to take such steps, although given the scale of the
increase in incarceration, sustained work will be needed.
CONCLUSION
Even the most prominent death sentencing counties have experienced
large declines in death sentencing-in fact they have experienced the largest
declines. No one expected or predicted such a rapid nationwide decline. The
death penalty has nearly vanished, and just a handful of outlier counties still
sentence people to death. Most of the counties that sentenced people to death
in the 1980s and 1990s no longer do so today.
As we describe in this Article, this decline does not reflect just one
cause. Yet there is a great deal of consistency in the patterns observed over
the years from 1990 to 2016, in which death sentences declined so
dramatically. During that time period, we observed a consistent relationship
between population density and death sentencing. The rural and less-
populated counties largely ceased imposing death sentences. Resource
constraints may play a critical role in the death sentencing decline. Second,
even among the relatively larger death sentencing counties, death sentences
are associated with counties with proportionally-greater black populations.
Third, homicide rates, when lagged by several years, are statistically
associated with death sentencing. But not all homicides are treated equally.
It is homicides with white victims that are correlated with death sentencing
trends. Finally, we observe a path dependency in which counties that
sentence more people to death continue to do so in relatively higher numbers.
The converse is that when a county stops death sentencing it may be unlikely
to reverse course and do so again.
The decline of the death penalty may be part of its undoing under the
U.S. Constitution, since it makes the death penalty more and more "unusual"
under the Eighth Amendment. The shrinking geography of the death penalty
has not escaped the notice of judges. In 2014, Justice Breyer emphasized in
his dissent in Glossip v. Gross that the death penalty has "increasingly
203 Office of Justice Programs, What is JRI?, JUSTICE REINvESTMENT INITIATIVE (May 15,
2017), https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/what isjri.html; Jason Pye,
Savings from Prison Reforms in Texas Top $3 Billion Crimes Rates Hit Lowest Point Since
1968, FREEDOM WORKS (July 6, 2015), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/savings-
prison-reforms-texas-top-3-billion-crimes-rates-hit-lowest-point-1968.
204 See generally GARRETr, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at ch. 10.
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become unusual," having "declined rapidly" in the last fifteen years, raising
heightened Eighth Amendment concerns. 205 Death sentences are at the low-
point reached just before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v.
Georgia. It is not just the raw fact of the decline that is troubling, but the
degree of arbitrariness reflected in these data. Lawyers will increasingly use
these data to show how few counties actually impose death sentences and
how arbitrary it is which counties still use the death penalty.
Whether or not the courts, state or federal, further regulate the process,
the death penalty is disappearing on the ground. What remains of the death
penalty is not just rare and geographically dispersed, but highly dependent
on path dependency and insidious factors such as race. The extreme
disparities in death penalty cases are an emblem for larger disparities in the
enforcement of criminal law. The decline of the American death penalty
provides a larger lesson: we must ensure that arbitrariness in local
punishment does not undermine the fairness of our system of justice.
APPENDIX
I. SUMMARY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table Al: Descriptive Statistics
Std.
Variable Category Mean Deviation Min Max N
Death sentences Overall 0.08 0.49 0.00 17.00 62,803
Between 0.34 0.00 8.24 2,612
Within 0.34 -7.16 10.52 24.04
FBI total homicide rate Overall 0.04 0.07 0.00 2.61 62,803
Between 0.04 0.00 0.52 2,612
Within 0.06 -0.48 2.55 24.04
FBI black homicide rate Overall 0.01 0.04 0.00 1.62 62,803
Between 0.03 0.00 0.46 2,612
Within 0.03 -0.45 1.55 24.04
FBI white homicide rate Overall 0.02 0.06 0.00 2.61 62,803
Between 0.02 0.00 0.29 2,612
205 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Within 0.06 -0.27 2.53 24.04
CDC total homicide rate Overall 0.04 0.07 0.00 2.34 62,803
Between 0.04 0.00 0.56 2,612
Within 0.06 -0.20 2.19 24.04
CDC black homicide rate Overall 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.71 62,803
Between 0.03 0.00 0.49 2,612
Within 0.03 -0.20 0.67 24.04
CDC white homicide rate Overall 0.03 0.06 0.00 2.34 62,803
Between 0.02 0.00 0.19 2,612
Within 0.05 -0.16 2.18 24.04
Black population share Overall 10.56 15.62 0.00 86.90 62,803
Between 15.38 0.00 86.16 2,612
Within 1.22 -18.13 33.63 24.04
Population density Overall 212.36 1,138.42 0.08 68,038.06 62,803
Between 1,707.19 0.13 60,765.29 2,612
Within 93.36 -6,944.23 7,485.13 24.04
Income per capita Overall 25,795.19 9,875.94 5,081.58 194,484.61 62,803
Between 6,738.54 13,174.46 133,412.06 2,612
Within 7,636.93 -38,645.83 120,673.45 24.04
Poverty rate Overall 15.41 6.10 1.86 57.80 50,349
Between 5.71 2.79 44.92 2,612
Within 2.15 0.18 35.34 19.28
Unemployment rate Overall 6.36 2.98 0.52 40.44 62,789
Between 2.24 1.04 23.49 2,612
Within 1.96 -5.14 30.18 24.04
Population share under 25 Overall 34.15 4.82 3.40 66.66 62,803
Between 4.52 3.68 64.42 2,612
Within 1.69 23.31 45.40 24.04
Cumulative death sentences Overall 2.76 11.65 0.00 314.00 62,803
Between 11.20 0.00 251.64 2,612
GARRETTETAL.
Share of years with 1+ death
sentence
Within 2.63 -112.88 91.08 24.04
Overall 5.08 10.95
Between
Within
0.00 91.11 62,803
0.00 87.24 2,612
1.53 -17.48 24.42 24.04
Table A2: State Death Sentences, 1990-2016
Homicides Homicides
Death Homicides Homicides Counties Sentences per county per county
sentences (FBI) (CDC) w/ data per county (FBI) (CDC)State
7,227 10,703
9,430 10,425
4,811 5,291
65,161 60,775
4,121 4,169
2,855 2,719
816 964
4,887 27,118
14,863 16,382
786 720
14,891 20,185
8,199 8,768
1,448 2,514
4,254 4,988
13,686 15,082
11,917 10,955
4,509 7,634
10,098 10,480
387 733
821 1,368
4,175 4,006
391 406
6,356 5,358
2,240 2,642
67 4.7
16 13.2
75 1.0
58 11.9
65 0.1
8 1.8
3 16.3
67 9.8
159 0.8
44 0.4
102 1.5
92 0.4
105 0.2
120 0.4
64 2.0
24 1.1
82 1.2
115 1.0
57 0.1
93 0.2
17 6.4
10 0.1
21 1.1
33 0.2
107.9 159.7
589.4
64.1
1,123.5
63.4
356.9
272.0
72.9
93.5
17.9
146.0
89.1
13.8
35.5
213.8
496.5
55.0
87.8
6.8
8.8
245.6
39.1
302.7
67.9
651.6
70.5
1,047.8
64.1
339.9
321.3
404.7
103.0
16.4
197.9
95.3
23.9
41.6
235.7
456.5
93.1
91.1
12.9
14.7
235.6
40.6
255.1
80.1
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Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hamp.
New Jersey
New Mexico
312
211
72
692
9
14
49
655
131
16
155
39
16
44
128
27
102
119
3
14
108
1
24
7
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7 7,795 7,263
317 14,405 15,357
249 12,389 12,986
197 5,528 5,678
51 2,467 2,573
267 17,029 16,698
119 8,190 8,118
9 316 418
97 10,333 11,625
663 38,568 37,458
6 1,435 1,312
101 10,781 10,036
New York
N. Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
S. Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming
5,072
378
62 0.1 125.7 117.1
100 3.2
88 2.8
77 2.6
36
67
1.4
4.0
144.1 153.6
140.8 147.6
71.8 73.7
68.5 71.5
254.2 249.2
46 2.6 178.0
66 0.1 4.8
95 1.0 108.8
254
29
133
39
23
2.6
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.0
176.5
6.3
122.4
151.8 147.5
49.5 45.2
81.1 75.5
132.9 130.1
15.0 16.4
Table A3: Top-25 Sentencing Counties, 1990-2016
Black
Pop. Income
Death Homicides Homicides Total Share Pop. per
Rank County State Sentences (FBI) (CDC) Pop. (%) density capita
1 Los Angeles CA 213 28,232 26,742 9,532,157 10.3 2348 33,650
2 Harris TX 182 10,274 10,250 3,573,512 19.3 2074 37,276
3 Maricopa AZ 127 6,418 6,732 3,197,505 4.5 347 30,886
4 Philadelphia PA 115 9,112 8,786 1,531,428 44.1 11352 28,373
5 Riverside CA 92 2,793 2,430 1,746,005 6.6 242 25,780
6 Clark NV 83 3,438 3,240 1,483,452 10.3 188 31,383
7 Duval FL 73 494 2,713 796,646 28.2 1033 30,976
8 Cook IL 71 13,748 15,414 5,250,489 26.3 5552 34,346
9 Oklahoma OK 71 1,834 1,881 674,143 15.5 951 32,838
10 Dallas TX 63 7,104 6,905 2,208,055 21.6 2515 36,504
11 Orange CA 60 2,475 2,185 2,828,582 2.0 3582 39,840
12 Miami-Dade FL 59 1,373 6,406 2,297,364 20.6 1188 29,861
13 Pima AZ 53 1,779 1,863 863,974 3.6 94 27,014
14 Bexar TX 51 3,512 3,452 1,484,127 7.7 1192 28,536
15 Tarrant TX 51 2,694 2,707 1,537,242 13.8 1780 32,370
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Jefferson AL
Alameda CA
Broward FL
Shelby TN
Hillsborough FL
Hamilton OH
St. Louis MO
Pinellas FL
Tulsa OK
San
Bernardino CA
49
48
46
42
42
39
39
38
2,326
3,697
401
3,865
354
1,524
904
197
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
3,207 659,628 39.8 593 33,946
3,536 1,438,101 15.3 1949 38,637
1,968 1,617,298 23.0 1339 33,599
4,175 897,395 49.4 1186 33,069
1,791 1,065,030 15.8 1021 30,855
1,647 833,613 24.1 2048 36,338
944 1,006,886 19.9 1983 42,979
1,231 909,418 9.5 3263 33,931
1,301 566,157 10.9 993 36,261
3,797 1,801,537 9.5 90 24,445
II. ROBUSTNESS REGRESSIONS: ADDITIONAL HOMICIDE RATE LAGS
Table A4: 2-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions
State & Year State-Year
Fixed-Effects Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at t-2 1.149"' 1.214 * 1.208"' 1.238*
(0.027) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
Percent black pop. 1.381* 1.409' 1.338* 1.955*
(0.156) (0.171) (0.165) (0.219)
Population density 4.477'* 5.535*' 8.035'" 8.315*
(1.434) (1.946) (2.745) (2.265)
Income per capita 1.368 1.172 0.734 0.872
(0.585) (0.529) (0.343) (0.430)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at t-2 1.518*' 1.475** 1.545"* 1.436*
(0.137) (0.125) (0.142) (0.062)
Percent black pop. 1. 122" 1.128" 1.117* 1.169*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.026)
Population density 2.220'" 2.205*' 2.230*' 2.155
(0.089) (0.093) (0.087) (0.046)
Income per capita 1.017 1.085 0.997 0.678'
(0.239) (0.273) (0.230) (0.095)
Observations 62,790 60,350 62,790 60,350
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
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County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, ' p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
Table A5: 3-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions
State & State-Year
Year Fixed- Fixed
Effects Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at 1.051' 1.137"' 1.092"' 1.165"'
t-3 (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030)
Percent black 1.411* 1.468" 1.371* 2.078"'
pop. (0.159) (0.188) (0.168) (0.240)
Population 4.397"' 6.490"' 8.038*'* 10.214"'
density (1.405) (2.422) (2.724) (2.861)
Income per capita 1.364 1.198 0.752 0.877
(0.581) (0.566) (0.349) (0.452)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at 1.528*" 1.477"' 1.556"' 1.485"'
t-3 (0.139) (0.126) (0.143) (0.065)
Percent black 1.122** 1.135"' 1.118* 1.171"*
pop. (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.027)
Population 2.244*" 2.225"* 2.255*" 2.104**
density (0.090) (0.095) (0.088) (0.045)
Income per capita 1.011 1.046 0.991 0.865
(0.239) (0.267) (0.230) (0.123)
Observations 62,780 57,907 62,780 57,907
State fixed- Yes Yes No No
effects
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ip<0. 10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.0 1, *** p<0.001
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Table A6: 4-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions
State & Year State-Year
Fixed-Effects Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at t-4
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at t-4
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
1.083*'"
(0.024)
1.403**
(0.159)
4.469***
(1.430)
1.328
(0.566)
1.521f'
(0.138)
1.123**
(0.042)
2.237***
(0.089)
1.007
(0.237)
1.109-
(0.031)
1.604*'
(0.222)
8.379-
(3.345)
1.339
(0.660)
1.482***
(0.127)
1.156*'
(0.045)
2.216'"
(0.097)
1.056
(0.275)
1.113'*
(0.028)
1.363*
(0.167)
8.019"'
(2.710)
0.738
(0.342)
1.549***
(0.142)
1.119-
(0.042)
2.252***
(0.088)
0.985
(0.228)
1.144*
(0.030)
2.260*
(0.269)
12.338-
(3.478)
0.887
(0.468)
1.484-
(0.067)
1.188'
(0.029)
2.096*
(0.047)
0.884
(0.129)
Observations 62,770 55,463 62,770 55,463
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ip<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A7: 5-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions
State & Year State-Year
Fixed-Effects Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at t-5
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at t-5
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
1.093*'
(0.024)
1.405"
(0.159)
4.528*"
(1.450)
1.310
(0.557)
1.525*'
(0.138)
1.122"
(0.042)
2.235"'
(0.089)
1.006
(0.237)
1.068*
(0.030)
1.611"'
(0.232)
9.255"'
(3.945)
0.948
(0.479)
1.456"'
(0.128)
1.154"'
(0.046)
2.267'*
(0.102)
0.966
(0.255)
1.116*'
(0.027)
1.368*
(0.169)
8.052"'
(2.718)
0.726
(0.336)
1.553"'
(0.143)
1.118*
(0.041)
2.252"'
(0.087)
0.983
(0.228)
1.101"'
(0.028)
2.287'*
(0.273)
12.852"'
(3.660)
0.620
(0.315)
1.475"'
(0.068)
1.183"'
(0.030)
2.124"'
(0.048)
0.871
(0.130)
Observations 62,760 53,018 62,760 53,018
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
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Table A8: 5-Year Moving Average Homicide Rate Negative
Binomial Regressions
State & Year State-Year
Fixed-Effects Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate (5-yr
moving avg.)
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
Homicide rate (5-yr
moving avg.)
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
1.214***
(0.052)
1.370"
(0.153)
4.907***
(1.609)
1.311
(0.566)
1.530***
(0.137)
1.119"
(0.042)
2.234***
(0.089)
1.029
(0.243)
1.536***
(0.101)
1.554"
(0.214)
9.629***
(3.951)
1.354
(0.674)
1.496'"
(0.128)
1.151*'
(0.046)
2.233***
(0.097)
1.068
(0.279)
1.329'*
(0.066)
1.340*
(0.163)
8.187***
(2.832)
0.743
(0.351)
1.555'**
(0.141)
1.115**
(0.041)
2.248***
(0.087)
1.015
(0.236)
1.469*
(0.095)
2.249*
(0.267)
13.420*
(3.833)
0.906
(0.478)
1.486'
(0.067)
1.187*
(0.029)
2.108*
(0.047)
0.900
(0.132)
Observations 62,770 55,448 62,770 55,448
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ip<0. 10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.0 1, -' p<0.001I
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III. ROBUSTNESS REGRESSIONS: POISSON RESULTS
Table A9: Baseline Poisson Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate 1.109*' 1.108*** 1.128** 1.115*
(0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
Percent black pop. 1.801' 1.757 1.958* 1.904
(0.399) (0.394) (0.534) (0.523)
Population density 4.088* 4.185* 6.763** 7.185*
(1.457) (1.528) (2.592) (2.872)
Income per capita 2.390' 2.458' 1.183 1.194
(1.233) (1.273) (0.710) (0.719)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate 1.546"' 1.524 1.546- 1.524*
(0.155) (0.151) (0.155) (0.150)
Percent black pop. 1.149" 1.155"* 1.149* 1.156*
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051)
Population density 2.107*' 2.078*' 2.104 * 2.078
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108)
Income per capita 0.801 0.900 0.834 0.935
(0.301) (0.347) (0.303) (0.350)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0 .1 0 , * p<0.05, - p<0.01, - p<0.00I
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Table A10: Race of Victim Poisson Regressions
[Vol. 107
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
White homicide rate
Black homicide rate
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
White homicide rate
Black homicide rate
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Observations
State fixed-effects
Year fixed-effects
State-Year fixed-
effects
Model converged
1.129'**
(0.029)
1.049
(0.033)
1.806'*
(0.412)
3.943"
(1.383)
2.364'
(1.199)
2.792"'
(0.451)
0.810,
(0.088)
1.460"*
(0.123)
2.069*"
(0.092)
1.004
(0.347)
1.125*"
(0.030)
1.049
(0.033)
1.804**
(0.412)
4.153*"
(1.577)
2.276
(1.158)
2.942'"
(0.528)
0.855
(0.083)
1.385'"
(0.101)
2.016"'
(0.099)
1.420
(0.462)
1.154"'
(0.033)
1.063'
(0.035)
1.942'
(0.533)
6.331"
(2.279)
1.164
(0.665)
2.788"'
(0.448)
0.812'
(0.088)
1.459"
(0.122)
2.063'"
(0.094)
1.046
(0.348)
1.133"
(0.029)
1.051
(0.032)
1.955*
(0.539)
7.074*
(2.838)
1.071
(0.624)
2.951"
(0.533)
0.853
(0.085)
1.388"
(0.104)
2.015"
(0.099)
1.478
(0.465)
62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
Yes Yes No No
Yes Yes No No
No No Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ip<0. 10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.0 1, *** p<0.001I
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Table All: 1-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Poisson Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at t-1 1.215"' 1.287"' 1.303"' 1.294"'
(0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Percent black pop. 1.755* 1.706' 1.895' 1.858'
(0.391) (0.389) (0.522) (0.517)
Population density 4.215"' 4.408"' 6.635"' 7.260"'
(1.522) (1.610) (2.557) (2.919)
Income per capita 2.288 2.410' 1.112 1.127
(1.186) (1.241) (0.673) (0.679)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at t-1 1.541 1.523"* 1.542"* 1.522**
(0.154) (0.150) (0.154) (0.150)
Percent black pop. 1.147" 1.152" 1.145" 1.153"
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051)
Population density 2.089- 2.059"* 2.079"* 2.059"*
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106)
Income per capita 0.807 0.902 0.846 0.939
(0.301) (0.344) (0.305) (0.349)
Observations 62,800 62,794 62,800 62,794
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, *' p<0.00I
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Table A12: 3-Year Moving Average Homicide Rate Poisson
Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate (3-yr 1.178" 1.409'" 1.307*" 1.430
moving avg.) (0.041) (0.074) (0.056) (0.068)
Percent black pop. 1.790" 1.804* 1.924* 2.003*
(0.397) (0.431) (0.528) (0.586)
Population density 4.246'" 5.441"' 6.880'" 8.714"
(1.548) (2.087) (2.665) (3.703)
Income per capita 2.358' 1.995 1.148 0.865
(1.221) (1.030) (0.693) (0.525)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate (3-yr 1.560*" 1.489"' 1.559*" 1.493"
moving avg.) (0.156) (0.147) (0.156) (0.148)
Percent black pop. 1. 144" 1.162*" 1.142" 1.161*
(0.048) (0.052) (0.049) (0.053)
Population density 2.105*" 2.103*" 2.096"' 2.097"
(0.105) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108)
Income per capita 0.814 0.864 0.855 0.937
(0.305) (0.340) (0.311) (0.357)
Observations 62,790 60,342 62,790 60,342
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, ** p<0.001
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Table A13: Sum of All Prior Sentences Poisson Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Cumulative death
sentences
Homicide rate
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
Cumulative death
sentences
Homicide rate
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
45.580***
(9.875)
1.047*
(0.022)
1.788*'
(0.147)
1.635
(0.615)
1.892
(0.789)
2.863***
(0.117)
0.779***
(0.048)
1.056*
(0.028)
1.116**
(0.039)
0.932
(0.135)
45.607***
(9.892)
1.057'
(0.029)
1.831***
(0.152)
1.600
(0.590)
1.883
(0.783)
2.807***
(0.116)
0.841**
(0.051)
1.033
(0.028)
1.125"'
(0.039)
0.924
(0.140)
56.172-
(11.511)
1.092***
(0.028)
1.527'
(0.133)
1.817*
(0.521)
1.134
(0.462)
2.873'**
(0.118)
0.770***
(0.047)
1.060'
(0.029)
1.114**
(0.040)
0.904
(0.140)
55.331-
(11.389)
1.050
(0.028)
1.586*
(0.142)
1.815
(0.515)
1.112
(0.461)
2.805'
(0.117)
0.841*
(0.053)
1.035
(0.029)
1.131*
(0.040)
0.898
(0.145)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sp<0. 10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.0 1, *** p<0.00 1
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Table A14: Share of Years with at Least 1 Death Sentence Poisson
Regressions
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Sentencing share of 77.033*' 76.948***
years (13.038) (13.067)
Homicide rate 0.980 0.952
(0.025) (0.032)
Percent black pop. 1.029 1.031
(0.159) (0.157)
Population density 2.627' 2.651'
(1.105) (1.125)
Income per capita 1.007 1.015
(0.458) (0.461)
Between-Effects
Sentencing share of 3.812"' 3.813-
years (0.247) (0.247)
Homicide rate 1.128 1.151'
(0.087) (0.088)
Percent black pop. 1.026 1.018
(0.034) (0.034)
Population density 1.308"' 1.299"'
(0.062) (0.061)
Income per capita 0.729 0.769
(0.182) (0.198)
Observations 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
State-Year fixed- No No
effects
Model converged Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, ' p<0.05, " p<0.01, .' p<0.001
96.200'
(13.482)
1.000
(0.030)
0.976
(0.153)
2.036*
(0.685)
0.631
(0.300)
3.877***
(0.241)
1.160'
(0.090)
1.013
(0.032)
1.308-
(0.061)
0.764
(0.186)
62,810
No
No
Yes
Yes
96.723*
(13.547)
0.966
(0.030)
0.980
(0.153)
2.054'
(0.694)
0.641
(0.304)
3.883*
(0.241)
1.189'
(0.091)
1.004
(0.032)
1.298*
(0.060)
0.812
(0.204)
62,803
No
No
Yes
Yes
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IV. ROBuSTNESS REGRESSIONS: NON-TRANSFORMED VARIABLES
Table A15: Baseline Negative Binomial Regressions (Non-
Transformed Variables)
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate 0.879 0.564* 0.851 0.845
(0.191) (0.125) (0.214) (0.203)
Percent black pop. 1.082"' 1.070"' 1.108'* 1.108-
(0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
Population density 1.002- 1.002' 1.001- 1.001-
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000, 1.000 1.000- 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate 5.0e+06*' 8.6e+05"' 2.3e+04.. 4086.963
(1.2e+07) (2.le+06) (1.6e+04) (2159.680)
Percent black pop. 0.993 0.993 1.009"* 1.008*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Population density 1.000+ 1.0001 1.000 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000", 1.000". 1.000- 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
.p<0. 10, * p<0.05, - p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A16: Race of Victim Negative Binomial Regressions (Non-
Transformed Variables)
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
White homicide rate 0.964 0.674* 1.128 0.960
(0.192) (0.131) (0.219) (0.228)
Black homicide rate 0.728 0.358 0.482 0.611
(0.436) (0.192) (0.269) (0.327)
Percent black pop. 1.088- 1.090'" 1.120'" 1.129*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
Population density 1.002*' 1.001- 1.001- 1.001-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000, 1.000 1.000- 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Between-Effects
White homicide rate 1.2e+10'" 7.0e+1 1* 7.4e+10"* 7.2e+10*
(4.4e+10) (2.8e+12) (7.6e+10) (7.2e+10)
Black homicide rate 8515.981' 134.583 52.386"* 11.884*
(3.6e+04) (440.957) (34.516) (6.159)
Percent black pop. 1.006 1.011 1.026'* 1.026-
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Population density 1.000+ 1.000+ 1.000* 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000' 1.000- 1.000"' 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.I p<0.10, * p<0.05, * p<0.01, *" p<0.001
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Table A17: 1-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions (Non-Transformed Variables)
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate at t-1
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
Homicide rate at t-1
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
3.036***
(0.771)
1.081" 
(0.018)
1.002"'
(0.000)
1.000,
(0.000)
5.0e+06***
(1.3e+07)
0.993
(0.004)
1.0001
(0.000)
1.000'
(0.000)
3.503***
(0.848)
1.069'"
(0.019)
1.002***
(0.001)
1.000
(0.000)
8.5e+05***
(2.1e+06)
0.993
(0.005)
1.000+
(0.000)
1.000-"
(0.000)
1.587*
(0.287)
1.108*'*
(0.011)
1.001-
(0.000)
1.000-
(0.000)
1.935*
(0.424)
1.108*'
(0.011)
1.001-"
(0.000)
1.000-'
(0.000)
1.9e+04"' 3782.035*
(1.2e+04) (1993.006)
1.009-
(0.002)
1.000*
(0.000)
1.000.'.
(0.000)
1.009-
(0.002)
1.000*
(0.000)
1.000'-
(0.000)
Observations 62,800 62,794 62,800 62,794
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
I p<0.10, * p<0.05, * p<0.01, - p<0.001
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Table A18: 3-Year Moving Average Homicide Rate Negative
Binomial Regressions (Non-Transformed Variables)
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Homicide rate (3-yr 3.257* 5.656"' 1.258 3.543*
moving avg.) (1.600) (2.626) (0.582) (1.582)
Percent black pop. 1.080"' 1.076' 1.107** 1.115*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011)
Population density 1.002.. 1.002** 1.001- 1.001-
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000 1.0001 1.000- 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Between-Effects
Homicide rate (3-yr 5.4e+06"* 5.2e+05** 2.le+04"* 2537.352*
moving avg.) (1.3e+07) (1.2e+06) (1.5e+04) (1336.510)
Percent black pop. 0.993 0.993 1.009"' 1.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Population density 1.000+ 1.000 1.000+ 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000- 1.000- 1.000 1.000-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 62,790 60,342 62,790 60,342
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
I p<0.10, ' p<0.05, " p<0.01, *' p<0.001
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Table 19: Sum of All Prior Sentences Negative Binomial
Regressions (Non-Transformed Variables)
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Cumulative death
sentences
Homicide rate
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
Between-Effects
Cumulative death
sentences
Homicide rate
Percent black pop.
Population density
Income per capita
0.684
(74.160)
1.345
(1933.537)
0.943
(49.960)
1.000
(0.174)
1.000
(0.010)
2.163
(3402.987)
0.012
(24.835)
1.003
(22.647)
1.000
(0.009)
1.000
(0.018)
1.016'
(0.009)
0.636'
(0.160)
1.067*'
(0.016)
1.001
(0.001)
1.000
(0.000)
1.049"'
(0.009)
242.473"*
(400.122)
0.996
(0.004)
1.000
(0.000)
1.000-*
(0.000)
0.570
(0.242)
0.022'
(0.043)
1.114-
(0.036)
1.012'
(0.006)
1.000
(0.000)
1.530
(0.451)
0.000
(0.000)
1.011
(0.010)
0.998
(0.001)
1.000-'
(0.000)
0.647'
(0.152)
0.005*
(0.005)
1.115'
(0.026)
1.011*
(0.004)
1.000
(0.000)
1.374*
(0.209)
0.000
(0.001)
1.012
(0.007)
0.999
(0.001)
1.000*'*
(0.000)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged No Yes No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
I p<0 . 10 , * p<0.05, " p<0.01, ** p<0.001
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Table A20: Share of Years with at Least 1 Death Sentence
Negative Binomial Regressions (Non-Transformed Variables)
State & Year Fixed-Effects State-Year Fixed Effects
FBI Data CDC Data FBI Data CDC Data
Within-Effects
Sentencing share of 1.175'" 1.175'" 1.188"' 1.189"
years (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Homicide rate 1.601' 0.951 1.852" 0.952
(0.386) (0.343) (0.410) (0.334)
Percent black pop. 0.987 0.987 0.957* 0.956*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Population density 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Between-Effects
Sentencing share of 1.032 * 1.032** 1.029'" 1.029"'
years (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Homicide rate 3.135 2.480 3.638 2.920
(4.738) (3.526) (5.309) (4.009)
Percent black pop. 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population density 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income per capita 1.000"' 1.000- 1.000". 1.000'
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 62,810 62,803 62,810 62,803
State fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
State-Year fixed- No No Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.I p<0.10, * p<0.05, * p<0.01, ** p<0.001
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V. ROBUSTNESS REGRESSIONS: PERIODIZED REGRESSION RESULTS
Table A21: FBI Baseline Neg. Binomial Regressions (Periodized
Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Homicide rate 1.120*" 1.225*'* 1.241"' 1.327"' 1.209"
(log) (0.038) (0.041) (0.050) (0.065) (0.079)
Percent black 4.446 * 7.743"* 1.280 1.196 0.634"
pop. (1.146) (2.193) (0.229) (0.205) (0.106)
Population 0.221* 0.120 51.302*" 34.568"' 79.708"'
density (0.160) (0.152) (47.612) (20.701) (44.600)
Income per capita 10.093" 31.968"' 64.343*'* 10.037' 0.010-
(8.453) (30.898) (66.056) (10.040) (0.010)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,619 11,985
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
Table A22: CDC Baseline Neg. Binomial Regressions (Periodized
Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Homicide rate 1.207 1.237*' 1.211** 1.280*' 1.156*
(log) (0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.057) (0.073)
Percent black 4.389 7.811 1.276 1.218 0.636"
pop. (1.109) (2.233) (0.233) (0.208) (0.106)
Population 0.263' 0.113' 54.882** 35.810"' 84.350
density (0.193) (0.137) (51.173) (21.562) (47.415)
Income per capita 8.389* 34.979"' 63.125*' 10.757* 0.010
(7.011) (33.509) (65.326) (10.712) (0.010)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,617 11,980
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, ' p<0.05, * p<0.01, " p<0.001
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Table A23: FBI Race of Victim Negative Binomial Regressions
(Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
White homicide 1.121' 1.189"' 1.215' 1.257'" 1.175'
rate (0.040) (0.041) (0.053) (0.059) (0.074)
Black homicide 1.088' 1.106' 1.069 1.233'* 0.956
rate (0.046) (0.050) (0.056) (0.091) (0.113)
Percent black 4.444** 7.841 - 1.273 1.131 0.646"
pop. (1.123) (2.203) (0.226) (0.185) (0.106)
Population 0.220' 0.117' 50.543- 33.160'" 85.619"'
density (0.155) (0.147) (47.415) (19.981) (47.924)
Income per capita 10.685" 33.239"' 64.039*'* 9.292' 0.009'
(8.927) (31.981) (66.129) (9.333) (0.009)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,619 11,985
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0. 10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.0 1, *** p<0.001I
Table A24: CDC Race of Victim Negative Binomial Regressions
(Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
White homicide 1.209"' 1.249"' 1.210"' 1.214*' 1.166'
rate (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.057) (0.072)
Black homicide 1.148" 1.025 1.108 1.304'" 1.014
rate (0.052) (0.049) (0.071) (0.099) (0.101)
Percent black 4.402*' 7.825'" 1.266 1.148 0.634"
pop. (1.097) (2.228) (0.227) (0.185) (0.105)
Population 0.278 0.109* 52.170"' 34.106"' 82.737'
density (0.203) (0.132) (48.190) (20.691) (46.815)
Income per capita 8.710" 35.101"' 60.404*" 10.280' 0.010"
(7.271) (33.551) (62.711) (10.107) (0.010)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,617 11,980
State fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
I p<0.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
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Table A25: FBI Sum of All Prior Sentences Negative Binomial
Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Sum of all prior 65.184 ' 4065.160' 2.2e+05- 9.1e+04* 2.0e+04
sentences (22.644) (1787.312) (1. 1e+05) (5.3e+04) (1.2e+04)
Homicide rate 1.115*** 1.154** 1.137* 1.182' 1.009
(log) (0.034) (0.040) (0.071) (0.088) (0.094)
Percent black 5.817** 5.080** 1.449 1.481 0.921
pop. (1.546) (1.511) (0.495) (0.503) (0.316)
Population 0.060 * 0.059+ 2.797 0.703 2.085
density (0.047) (0.086) (2.917) (0.523) (1.357)
Income per capita 9.374* 12.255* 8.620+ 11.544* 0.873
(7.388) (12.651) (9.576) (13.481) (1.255)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,619 11,985
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes No No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p<0. 10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.0 1, *** p<0.001I
Table A26: CDC Sum of All Prior Sentences Negative Binomial
Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Sum of all prior 65.302** 4221.424*' 2.3e+05*' 9.3e+04*' 2.0e+04"
sentences (22.952) (1843.971) (1.2e+05) (5.4e+04) (1.2e+04)
Homicide rate 1.199*'* 1.253*' 1.087 1.125 1.007
(log) (0.035) (0.046) (0.069) (0.083) (0.097)
Percent black 5.713** 5.004 1.467 1.482 0.921
pop. (1.550) (1.470) (0.502) (0.505) (0.316)
Population 0.072** 0.060* 2.955 0.712 2.086
density (0.057) (0.086) (3.075) (0.532) (1.357)
Income per capita 7.360* 12.468* 8.771' 12.193* 0.876
(5.660) (12.751) (9.750) (14.259) (1.260)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,617 11,980
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes No No No
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ' p<0.01, ' p<0.001
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Table A27: FBI Share of Years with at Least 1 Death Sentence
Negative Binomial Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Share of years w/ 124.711*' 462.013"' 1033.169"' 195.495"' 177.593"'
1+ sentences (29.216) (125.542) (382.680) (67.604) (73.423)
Homicide rate 1.154"' 1.153"' 1.283*' 1.328"' 1.210'
(log) (0.041) (0.048) (0.078) (0.090) (0.103)
Percent black 4.400'" 7.846'" 1.606 1.362 0.738
pop. (0.976) (2.597) (0.527) (0.410) (0.201)
Population 0.093" 0.204 14.918* 9.042" 15.521"'
density (0.069) (0.238) (16.962) (7.108) (11.244)
Income per capita 3.873 100.483' 42.694* 6.560 0.017**
(3.243) (108.535) (50.031) (7.625) (0.024)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,619 11,985
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, * p<0.01, - p<0.00
Table A28: CDC Share of Years with at Least 1 Death Sentence
Negative Binomial Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14ttt ..
Share of years w/
1+ sentences
Homicide rate
(log)
Percent black
pop.
Population
density
Income per capita
123.254*'*
(28.841)
1.214***
(0.055)
4.385'"
(0.974)
0.114"
(0.085)
2.964
(2.474)
472.890"'
(127.791)
1.253'**
(0.061)
7.684"'
(2.546)
0.203
(0.236)
100.135***
(108.335)
1052.224-
(393.919)
1.220"
(0.074)
1.587
(0.521)
18.062'
(20.626)
40.211"
(47.308)
201.536
(69.610)
1.307***
(0.087)
1.365
(0.409)
9.504"
(7.488)
6.906'
(7.991)
175.329
(72.142)
1.151+
(0.098)
0.735
(0.198)
16.590"'
(11.954)
0.018"
(0.024)
Observations 12,286 12,958 12,962 12,617 11,980
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
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Table A29: FBI 1-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Homicide rate at 1.266' 1.358"' 1.501 * 1.474"' 1.193"
t-1 (0.047) (0.050) (0.063) (0.074) (0.071)
Percent black 4.308** 7.325* 1.288 1.192 0.633-
pop. (1.235) (2.028) (0.232) (0.204) (0.107)
Population 0.216* 0.154 47.749"' 32.153"' 81.311
density (0.149) (0.199) (45.570) (19.322) (46.390)
Income per capita 9.606" 30.630"' 53.129"' 9.979' 0.010-
(8.108) (29.290) (54.377) (9.930) (0.010)
Observations 12,281 12,958 12,962 12,619 11,980
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.10, ' p<0.05, " p<0.01, "' p<0.001
Table A30: CDC 1-Year Lagged Homicide Rate Negative Binomial
Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Homicide rate at 1.377" 1.402*'* 1.462... 1.414'* 1.241 '
t-1 (0.051) (0.059) (0.058) (0.075) (0.072)
Percent black 4.271 7.569"* 1.278 1.221 0.637"
pop. (1.203) (2.116) (0.237) (0.209) (0.105)
Population 0.304' 0.127' 46.239"' 33.701 81.061
density (0.218) (0.158) (42.570) (20.241) (45.862)
Income per capita 7.615* 35.281"' 55.722*** 10.513' 0.011**
(6.482) (33.524) (57.518) (10.461) (0.011)
Observations 12,281 12,958 12,962 12,617 11,976
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ip<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A31: FBI 3-Year Moving Average Homicide Rate Negative
Binomial Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Homicide rate (3 1.285 ' 1.388*' 1.618'' 1.627'. 1.178'
yr. moving avg.) (0.075) (0.087) (0.116) (0.121) (0.107)
Percent black 4.462"' 7.786*' 1.283 1.188 0.625
pop. (1.288) (2.232) (0.240) (0.214) (0.105)
Population 0.200* 0.143 51.725'" 37.207'" 87.472*
density (0.140) (0.187) (49.934) (22.859) (50.337)
Income per capita 10.900" 31.694'" 56.457'" 9.735* 0.009*
(9.236) (30.677) (58.933) (9.924) (0.009)
Observations 12,278 12,956 12,962 12,619 11,975
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A32: CDC 3-Year Moving Average Homicide Rate Negative
Binomial Regressions (Periodized Results)
90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Homicide rate (3 1.578*** 1.721'" 1.628"' 1.663'" 1.341
yr. moving avg.) (0.135) (0.118) (0.100) (0.134) (0.119)
Percent black 5.860*** 8.102*** 1.296 1.213 0.635*
pop. (1.795) (2.202) (0.252) (0.210) (0.105)
Population 0.277 0.125 49.817"' 38.342** 88.173*
density (0.228) (0.159) (46.549) (23.546) (50.680)
Income per capita 4.548 36.693*' 59.818'" 10.658* 0.009*
(4.496) (35.683) (62.706) (10.796) (0.009)
Observations 9,845 12,956 12,960 12,615 11,966
State fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Year fixed- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Model converged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression coefficients expressed as factor changes.
County-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ip<O.10, * p<0.05, " p<0.01, ** p<0.001
